CCCI-CCIC

Richesses spoliées, vies compromises: le coût humain de la fuite des capitaux en Afrique

2012-02-27T10:51:00.001-05:00

L’analyse dans le livre La Dette odieuse de l’Afrique révèle le fait choquant que l’Afrique sub-Saharienne (SSA) est ‘créditrice’ nette vis-à-vis du reste du monde, dans la mesure où le stock des capitaux ayant fuit le sous-continent excède de loin le stock de sa dette extérieure. La fuite des capitaux est estimée à plus de 700 milliards de dollars sur la période de 1970 à 2008, contre une dette totale de 175 milliards de dollars en 2008. L’analyse révèle aussi que la fuite des capitaux est étroitement liée aux flux d’emprunts publics. Pour chaque dollar emprunté, en moyenne plus de 50 cents quittent subtilement le continent africain dans la même année. En fait souvent l’argent ne sort même pas des banques ayant financé le crédit à l’état africain ; par un jeu d’écriture, une partie des prêts se retrouve sur le compte privé du dirigeant chargé de négocier la dette pour son pays. Ainsi la fuite des capitaux et la dette extérieure sont liées par une « porte tournante », facilitée par la corruption du côté des dirigeants africains et la complicité de leurs banquiers dans les centres financiers occidentaux.

Un autre conduit de la fuite des capitaux est la manipulation des paiements du commerce extérieur. Les importateurs gonflent la facture des importations afin de récupérer un excédent de change, alors que les exportateurs sous-déclarent la valeur des marchandises vendues et dissimulent la différence dans les comptes bancaires à l’extérieur. Les pertes par le biais de ces manipulations du commerce extérieur sont plus manifestes dans le secteur des ressources naturelles où opèrent de grandes multinationales. Celles-ci profitent de la complexité des opérations et du grand volume des transactions dans ce secteur pour minimiser leur facture d’impôt. L’évasion fiscale est devenue encore plus facile avec la prolifération des paradis fiscaux et la complexité de la structure de la gouvernance des multinationales. Ainsi les pays africains se voient spoliés de leurs richesses en même temps qu’ils continuent à peiner pour payer des dettes extérieures dont une partie a alimenté la fuite des capitaux – ou ‘dettes odieuses’. Entre temps, le service des dettes odieuses prive les gouvernements africains de fonds nécessaires pour le financement des services sociaux notamment les soins de santé.

Évidemment même lorsqu’une fraction de l'emprunt extérieur est détournée, l'Afrique reçoit toujours un afflux net d'argent, inférieure quand bien même à la valeur nominale de la dette. La ponction nette vient dans les années subséquentes lorsque la dette est remboursée, dans son entièreté, avec intérêt. En utilisant les données de la Banque mondiale, nous estimons qu’avec chaque dollar supplémentaire de service de la dette, 29 cents de moins sont consacrés aux soins de santé publique, et que chaque réduction de $40.000 en dépenses de santé se traduit par un décès infantile supplémentaire. Ainsi, nous estimons que le service de la dette sur les prêts qui ont alimenté la fuite des capitaux occasionne plus de 77.000 décès de nourrissons supplémentaires par an. La fuite des capitaux n’est donc pas seulement de l’escroquerie financière ; elle occasionne des pertes en vies humaines.

Que faire ? La responsabilité de la fuite des capitaux incombe aussi bien aux gouvernants africains qu’aux acteurs occidentaux, tant les banques qui sont complices dans la dissimulation des fonds que tout bailleur de fonds qui met ses intérêts stratégiques au-dessus des besoins de développement. Le plus grand défi essentiel est la transparence dans la gestion de la dette et des ressources nationales ainsi que la bonne diligence dans les opérations bancaires et le financement du développement. Les pays africains devraient procéder à un audit systématique des dettes publiques pour établir leur légitimité. Ils auront alors droit de répudier unilatéralement toute dette jugée illégitime ou ‘odieuse’ dans la mesure où : (1) la dette a été contractée sans le consentement du peuple (notamment par un gouvernement dictateur) ; (2) la dette n’a pas bénéficié au peuple (le crédit n’a pas financé le développement) ; et (3) le bailleur de fonds savait ou était en mesure de savoir si oui ou non les deux premières conditions sont remplies. Un processus transparent d’audit établirait l’objectivité de la répudiation sélective de la dette. Elle protègerait les créanciers légitimes en pénalisant les spéculateurs et les complices de la corruption, et contribuerait aussi à améliorer l’efficacité de l’aide.

Les gouvernements partenaires de l’Afrique comme le Canada ont un rôle essentiel à jouer dans le combat contre la fuite des capitaux en Afrique. En capitalisant sur sa longue expérience d’appui au développement en Afrique, le Canada pourrait soutenir cette cause en donnant l’appui technique et financier aux pays africains pour l’exécution de l’audit des dettes publiques. Le Canada pourrait aussi appuyer les unités d’intelligence financière (Financial Intelligence Units) dans les gouvernements africains en charge de la prévention de la fuite des capitaux, l’évasion fiscale, le blanchiment de l’argent et tous les autres délits financiers. Il est aussi impératif que le Canada continue à assurer une réputation de transparence dans son système bancaire en exigeant des banques qu’elles déclarent systématiquement les transactions suspectes, notamment celles des personnes africaines politiquement exposées (politically exposed persons - PEP). Enfin, le Canada pourrait donner un bon exemple, à l’instar de la Norvège, en procédant lui-même à un audit systématique de ses crédits et dons aux pays africains pour s’assurer que les fonds publics sont effectivement utilisés pour le financement du développement. Ces mesures profiteraient non seulement aux peuples africains, mais elles contribueraient aussi à bâtir une architecture financière internationale plus transparente. Sans de tels changements structurels, l’allègement de la dette africaine au mieux ne peut offrir qu’un palliatif temporaire au problème d’endettement.

Par Léonce Ndikumana

Andrew Glyn Professor of Economics and Director of the African Policy Program

Department of Economics and Political Economy Research Institute (PERI)

University of Massachusetts at Amherst

Léonce Ndikumana présentera des conférences sur ce sujet à Ottawa et à Montréal les 27, 28 et 29 février prochains. L’horaire des conférences est disponible au : Conférences Léonce Ndikumana

February 2012: Message from the President-CEO / Message de la présidente - directrice générale

2012-02-24T13:17:00.003-05:00

This blog post is an excerpt from CCIC's February 2012 Flash e-bulletin

Dear CCIC members and friends,

I was away for almost a month during Jan – Feb, and dizzied at the amount of activity that ensued during my absence! Before I left we had been busily working with the provincial and regional councils on polishing and putting out a massive survey intended to capture the experience of CSOs to date with CIDA’s Partnership with Canadians Branch new competitive funding mechanism. A total of 158 organizations, from our collective memberships and beyond, responded to the survey. This represents at least a 25% response rate (accounting for overlaps in memberships), which I understand is very good. We also had more than 50% of the organizations that participated in the Under and Over $2m calls for proposals complete the survey, making it a significant sample of those most affected by the calls-for-proposals mechanism.

So, while I was away, we had a team of two consultants pouring over the vast results of the survey, doing as fine an analysis as possible of the outcomes and the impacts of this new mechanism. And the combined CCIC and ICN (Inter-Council Network of Provincial/Regional Councils for International Cooperation) team reviewing and commenting on several drafts of the survey report and recommendations. As I write these lines, the report is in the last stages of being edited and translated for dissemination. The conclusions and recommendations are numerous and the challenges it spells out for our sector are important. We plan to share it widely amongst respondents, decision makers, the media and the public as of next week and get to work with all of you over the coming months on building our resilience in these challenging times.

We will use our newly created website section, CIDA Partnership with Canadians Branch, to post this report online. If you have not already done so, please check out this new section of our site which is intended to make it easy for our members and other users to easily locate information related to all PWCB things!

On a related development, the team has been working hard to complete the member-only section of our website. Over the month of March all CCIC member organizations (through your ED) will receive an e-mail that provides instructions on how to access the member-only section as well as your unique password. In this section - which will include a board-only section as well as sections for specific working groups and other - we will post all kinds of information that is useful for members but not necessarily for the general public, and also information of a sensitive nature when required. This section will be the place for members to also share their own information with other members in a variety of ways. So, dear members, keep a close eye on your inboxes for the e-mail that will provide you the key to this great new CCIC resource!

And while I was away, there was (and continues to be) a flurry of news items around the issue of NGOs, the mining sector and CIDA. That kept me coming back to my screen in between the packing up of our house in India and my step-daughter’s wedding…..! Since I landed, I have been in touch with many of you to discuss this issue, and to craft the ways in which CCIC can work with the different actors in our sector, who are directly implicated in this important debate, to jointly map out and discuss the risks and challenges associated with these initiatives and more broadly with the new role that the private sector is set to play in aid and development. The latter will no doubt be a central theme of our work over the coming months at CCIC, and we hope to see a broad involvement of our membership in a dialogue on this crucial issue.

An important step in my family’s move to Canada has been completed successfully during my trip to India, and I am now that much more here and very much looking forward to our collective work over the coming months!

In solidarity,

Julia

Chers membres et amis du CCCI,

J’ai été absente presqu’un mois en janvier-février, et je suis étourdie par tout ce qui s’est passé Durant mon absence! Avant que je ne parte, nous avions travaillé fort avec les conseils régionaux et provinciaux de coopération internationale afin de finaliser et de distribuer un long sondage portant sur l’expérience des OSC à ce jour avec le nouveau processus de financement compétitif mis de l’avant par la Direction des partenariats avec les Canadiens. 158 organisations, issues de notre membership collectif et d’autres, ont répondu au sondage. Cela représente un taux de réponse d’au moins 25% (en tenant compte des organisations membres de deux conseils), ce qui est très bon. Egalement, plus de 50% des organisations qui ont participé aux appels de propositions pour des projets de moins et de plus de 2 millions % ont complété le sondage, ce qui représente un échantillonnage significatif des organisations touchées par les appels d’offres.

Donc, pendant que j’étais en voyage, une équipe de deux consultants a mis ensemble les nombreuses réponses du sondage et a fait une analyse aussi pointue que possible des résultats et des impacts de ce nouveau mécanisme. Les équipes du CCCI et du RCC (Réseau de coordination des conseils, regroupant les conseils régionaux et provinciaux de coopération internationale) ont revu et commenté plusieurs versions du rapport sur le sondage et les recommandations. Alors que j’écris ces lignes, le rapport en est aux dernières étapes d’édition et de traduction. Il contient de nombreuses conclusions et recommandations et fait ressortir les défis auxquels notre secteur est confronté. Le rapport sera distribué largement parmi les participants au sondage, les preneurs de décisions, dans les médias et le grand public la semaine prochaine. Nous travaillerons avec vous tous dans les prochains mois afin de consolider notre capacité à rebondir dans ces temps difficiles.

Nous utiliserons une nouvelle section créée sur notre site web, Direction générale des partenariats avec les Canadiens de l’ACDI, pour mettre le rapport en ligne. Si ce n’est déjà fait, allez visiter cette nouvelle section de notre site, dont le but est de regrouper toute l’information relative à la DGPC pour un accès plus facile pour nos membres.

Sur un sujet relié, l’équipe a travaillé fort pour compléter la section reserve aux membres de notre site web. Toutes les organisations membres du CCCI recevront en mars (envoyé au directeur) un courriel avec les instructions sur comment accéder à la section pour les membres ainsi que votre mot de passe personnel. Dans cette section – qui comprendra également une sous-section pour le C.A. et des sous-sections pour les groupes de travail et autres – nous mettrons de l’information utile aux membres mais pas nécessairement d’intérêt public ainsi que de l’information de nature plus délicate, si nécessaire. Cette section permettra également aux membres de partager leurs propres informations de différentes façons. Alors, chers membres, surveillez votre boîte de courriels pour l’information qui vous donnera la clé à cette nouvelle ressource épatante du CCCI!

Pendant mon absence, il y a eu (et il y a encore) de nombreuses publications dans les médias concernant les ONGs, le secteur minier et l’ACDI. Cela me ramenait à mon ordinateur entre la préparation au déménagement en Inde et le mariage de ma belle-fille! Depuis mon retour, j’ai été en contact avec plusieurs d’entre vous pour discuter de ce sujet, et pour explorer des façons pour le CCCI de travailler avec les différents acteurs dans notre secteur qui sont directement impliqués dans ce débat important, afin d’identifier et de discuter des risques et défis associés avec ces initiatives et plus largement, avec le nouveau rôle que le secteur privé est appelé à jouer dans l’aide et le développement. Nul doute que ce dernier point sera un thème central de notre travail dans les prochains mois au CCCI, et nous espérons que nos membres participeront activement au dialogue sur ce sujet d’une grande importance.

Une étape importante du déménagement de ma famille au Canada a été complétée avec succès lors de ce voyage en Inde, et je suis maintenant encore plus ici, motivée par tout ce que nous ferons ensemble dans les prochains mois!

Solidairement,

Julia

Defending Land and Life in Marmato, Colombia: Moral and Legal Challenges (Part 3)

2012-02-20T11:38:00.012-05:00

Some of our most interesting meetings are with the staff and executives of Gran Colombia Gold. We meet with them on two occasions: once in Bogotá and once in Marmato. In Bogotá, we meet with CEO María Consuelo Araújo, who served as Colombia’s Foreign Affairs minister from 2006 to 2007. Araújo resigned from cabinet in the midst of a scandal linking several of her family members to paramilitaries, the right-winged armed actors responsible for many of the political killings and human rights violations in Colombia. María Consuelo Araújo’s brother, former senator Alvaro Araújo Castro, was sentenced to 9.5 years of jail for conspiring with illegal paramilitary groups to intimidate voters with violence in the lead up to the 2002 elections. Her cousin Hernando Molina Araújo, former governor of the province of Cesar, was sentenced to 7.5 years of prison for his involvement with paramilitary groups, who allegedly financed his election campaign and threatened his principle opponent. The Araújo family is an excellent example of the connections that too often exist between the state, the corporate sector and illegal armed actors in Colombia.

In Marmato, we meet with Gran Colombia Gold’s environmental manager and its director of sustainability. They strongly emphasize the fact that many small-scale miners in Marmato are operating without titles and are therefore “illegal”. Our conversations with the small scale-miners, however, suggest that the situation is far more complex. In 2001, CIDA-sponsored changes to the Colombian mining code eliminated the differences between small-scale and large-scale mining. This forced artisanal miners and multinationals to compete for titles under the same conditions, despite their different environmental impacts, economic benefits, levels of state protection and tax exemptions. Small-scale miners, who had less knowledge, experience and money than multinationals, were naturally hampered by this process. Many failed to secure the titles they needed to continue working in the mines that had sustained them for generations. Recent estimates suggest that 70% of small-scale miners who applied for titles did not receive them, while 90% of mining areas have been granted to multinationals. There therefore seems to be an important gap between the legal dimension and the moral dimension of this question. One small-scale miner from Marmato sums it up nicely: “We may be now be “illegal”, but we are legitimate. We are doing the same thing that we have been doing for generations. The only thing that has changed is that unjust laws, laws that were designed to benefit multinationals, have been put in place”.

These laws seem all the more unjust when one considers that they not always work both ways. According to the mining code, if a mine is abandoned for more than 6 months, the owner loses the right to the title. As Gran Colombia Gold acquired mines in Marmato, it closed them down to focus its efforts on exploration and the acquisition of further mines. These mines have been sitting empty for months - sometimes years – but the state has not stripped the company of its titles. Nor did it prevent police and company security guards from evicting the small-scale miners when they entered the mines after 6 months, incensed that they were jobless while their former mines – the ones they had lost the legal right to work in - sat empty.

Another legal and moral challenge is the debate surrounding the right to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) for afro-Colombian and indigenous peoples in Colombia. This right is is enshrined in the country's constitution, as well as in the ILO’s Convention 169 on the rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (which Colombia has ratified) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (which Colombia supports). More than 50% of Marmato’s population is afro-Colombian and 17% is indigenous. However these groups must be formally organized and self-governed for the right to FPIC to be recognized. The afro-Colombian and indigenous communities in Marmato are not: they live among the rest of the population and are therefore not legally protected by the right to FPIC. I find myself reflecting on the ostensible goal of this right. Presumably, it serves to protect people’s prior right to their lands and resources, and to enhance their ability to control their own development in a context of growing inequality and vulnerability. Why, then, should the people of Marmato – indigenous or not, self-governed or not – not have the right to consent to changes on the land they have lived and worked on for hundreds of years?

The geological situation in Marmato is also complex. Gran Colombia Gold and the Colombian government claim that Marmato’s historical center is susceptible to landslides and that its residents should move for their own safety. It is true that the hillside is crumbling and that there is loose mining debris in many places. The people of Marmato acknowledge that the situation isn’t perfect but think it’s ironic that nobody was concerned about their “safety” until a powerful multinational wanted to move the town to build an open-pit mine. They feel the same way about recent attacks on their environmental record. If the government was so concerned about their environmental practices, they ask, why didn’t it ever say anything or provide them with training and support? Small-scale miners take issue with claims that Gran Colombia Gold, with its technical expertise and sophisticated practices, will do less environmental damage than artisanal miners. They believe that large-scale mining will necessarily have large-scale impacts, especially when analyzed from a sustainability point of view. The proposed open-pit mine project would last 20 years. After this time had elapsed, there would be no gold left for small-scale mining and there would be a large hole in an otherwise pristine landscape. Artisanal miners feel that it would be better, from both an environmental and human sustainability point of view, for them to continue mining at their current pace – something that could sustain them for another 200 years.

Whether they have legal arguments, moral arguments, or both, one thing that the small-scale miners in Marmato do not have is power. At odds with the company and feeling abandoned by their own government, the people of Marmato see international solidarity as a last bastion of hope. They want Canadian investors to learn about, and begin to question, Gran Colombia Gold’s behaviour in Marmato - since companies are first and foremost accountable to their shareholders and likely to be most responsive to this type of pressure. International solidarity through the presence of a delegation succeeded in drawing media attention (see article in La Patria and interviews on LPTV) and allowed small-scale miners to engage in direct dialogue with government officials and company executives (these meetings are usually difficult for them to secure on their own, given the power differentials between them and the upper spheres of society).

So what can we, as interested Canadians, do to support people like the small-scale miners in Marmato – knowing that we are sometimes their best hope? First, we can become more responsible and informed investors and shareholders. Second, we can support urgent action and public awareness campaigns (for more information about these strategies, contact Brittany Lambert). Third, we can analyze these situations within the broader context of Canadian foreign policy, and call for change. For example, Canada and Colombia recently signed a free trade agreement and there is concern that it will protect and promote foreign investment at the expense of many ordinary Colombians. There is no doubt that trade and foreign investment can drive growth in the right circumstances. However, in a country characterized by complex historical relationships between the state, the corporate sector and illegal armed forces, and in which the right to unionize is severely constricted, free trade may have unintended negative consequences. Canada and Colombia have signed a treaty requiring both governments to report annually on the human rights impacts of the free trade agreement. The first reports will be released in May 2012. We, as interested Canadians, must ensure that these reports are not just public relations exercises. We must hold our elected officials accountable for ensuring that negative findings have real consequence, and are not just shelved in a library.

If you are interested in seeing pictures of Marmato and of the delegation, please explore our Flickr album.

This blog post was written by Brittany Lambert, coordinator of CCIC's Americas Policy Group (APG).

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC, APG or their members.

Defending Land and Life in Marmato, Colombia: Patterns of Division and Violence (Part 2)

2012-02-16T23:58:00.012-05:00

It is immediately obvious to me that the people of Marmato have put a huge amount of effort into organizing our agenda. Despite their humble roots, they have managed to bring in an impressive roster of lawyers, social leaders, unionists, researchers and journalists from all over Colombia to meet with us.

Our first activity is a meeting with people from other Colombian communities affected by Gran Colombia Gold. One of these people is a young environmental leader from Arboleda, in the department of Nariño. He explains that his community, once characterized by peace and solidarity, has been embroiled in conflict since Gran Colombia Gold’s arrival in January 2011. Residents who expressed concerns about the mining project have received death threats through anonymous text messages and phone calls. This has polarized the town and driven a deep wedge between those who oppose the project and those who are embracing it by seeking employment with the company.

I ask whether Gran Colombia Gold has created similar divides in Marmato, and am reassured that the social fabric here is still relatively intact. However, many people worry that this won’t last long. Even as an inexperienced outsider, I see signs of social conflict looming around the corner. For example, after one of our meetings, a mine owner approaches me and shows me a contract that Gran Colombia Gold has offered him. The company wants to buy his mine, and commits to employing him and his miners. He asks me if I think he should sign it – he is only semi-literate and is concerned that he might not understand all the small print. He tells me that another mine owner recently signed a similar contract and that the company honoured its commitment to hire him and his workers, but then fired them all two months later. I feel unequipped to offer advice on such an important legal matter and tell him that he should consult a lawyer. He replies that there are no lawyers in Marmato and that people like him are feeling their way through the dark trying to make the right decisions. After he leaves, two other miners approach me. They tell me not to trust the previous man: People like him, they say, are allowing the company to tighten its grip on Marmato by selling their mines for personal gain. I realize that it’s just a matter of time before these tensions reach boiling point here too. Sadly, it’s clear to me that these tension are not caused by people acting in bad faith, but rather by people trying to navigate through complex and scary new realities with very little knowledge or legal guidance.

Violence is another thing that many people feel is likely to increase in Marmato. So far, in comparison to other mining-affected communities, Marmato has been quite peaceful. Other than the murder of the town’s parish priest in September 2011, there has been no real violence in Marmato. However, our encounters with human rights defenders from other parts of Colombia make me realize that this is the exception, not the rule. A miners’ union leader from Segovia, another community affected by Gran Colombia Gold, is accompanied by a personal bodyguard at all times. A young lawyer, who works with mining-affected communities in Antioquia, wears a bullet-proof vest. When Paul Webster, the journalist on our delegation, asks the environmental defender from Nariño if he can quote him in an article, the young man says no - explaining that he fears for his safety. These subtle signs remind me that Colombia is still very much in the midst of an armed conflict - a highly complex one in which political, economic and social forces are intricately linked. As if to confirm the predictions that violence in Marmato will increase, a Colombian journalist who produced a documentary on our delegation's visit to Marmato (see part 1, part 2 and part 3) received a death threat shortly after the film was released.

Our conversations with people from other mining-affected communities in Colombia reveal clear and consistent patterns. Despite the different contexts, their stories of violence and intimidation, especially in relation to foreign extractive companies operating on their land, are eerily similar. These patterns make it very difficult for ordinary Colombians to resist corporate extractive activity. They also highlight the inequalities that exist between North and South, especially between foreign capital from the North and ordinary people from the South. As one young Colombian we met so aptly put it: "imagine if the situation were reversed: if a Colombian mining company went into a Canadian town and forced residents to relocate so that it could create an open-pit mine". He's right, it's difficult to imagine...

This blog post was written by Brittany Lambert, coordinator of CCIC's Americas Policy Group (APG).

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC, APG or their members.

Defending Land and Life in Marmato, Colombia: A Call for International Solidarity (part 1)

2012-02-13T14:00:00.016-05:00

Marmato is a small town nestled in the rolling green hills of Colombia’s coffee growing region. The surrounding area exudes tranquility and natural beauty with its shimmering coffee bushes, idyllic farms and singing birds. Entering the town of Marmato is like stepping back in time. Horses and donkeys carry lumber up the steep cobblestone streets. A painted scribe on one of town’s historical buildings alludes to Marmato’s long history of small-scale gold mining. The town’s rich culture and history explain why, in 1982, Marmato was declared a national heritage site.

In Marmato’s central plaza, residents greet each other with smiles and hugs, and invite each other to sit down for coffee. I am struck by the sense of happiness and community in this small town. Residents are quick to confirm this in conversation. They tell me that Marmato is a peaceful community in which everyone has work and no one goes hungry – things that can’t be taken for granted everywhere in Colombia. Their love for, and pride in, their town is obvious.

Lately, however, there is change in the air in Marmato. Residents are increasingly being pulled away from their friendly reunions in cafés and bars to deal with more serious matters. Marmato lies on a mountain that is believed to contain some of the largest gold reserves in the world – reserves that have recently caught the eye of Canadian mining company Gran Colombia Gold.

For many years, small- and large-scale mining coexisted in Marmato. A legal horizontal division, created in 1954, reserved the lower part of the mountain for large-scale mining and the upper part of the mountain for small-scale artisanal mining. For generations, the small-scale miners operated informally. But in 2001, CIDA-sponsored reforms to the Colombian mining code obliged small-scale miners to formalize their operations and obtain mining titles from the government. This created several problems for the artisanal miners in Marmato. The vast majority of miners were unable to secure titles within the allotted timeframe: Many were unaware that the rules had changed, others lacked the resources and know-how to complete the process, and others applied but were never attended to. Simultaneously, the mining company now known as Gran Colombia Gold was competing for the same titles, often more successfully. It was also pressuring the few small-scale miners who had managed to obtain legal titles to sell them. As a result, many small-scale miners in Marmato have now lost the legal right to work in the mines that have secured their livelihoods for generations.

The company began exploring the feasibility of creating an open-pit mine on the mountain, and determined that the town of Marmato would have to be moved. It began designing plans to relocate Marmateños to El Llano, a community located a few kilometers downhill. Marmato residents mobilized against these plans, arguing that the company had not respected its obligation to obtain free, prior and informed consent from the community. Marmato’s parish priest, José Reinel Restrepo, was a strong voice in defense of the community’s right to remain on its territory. On August 28th 2011, he appeared in a documentary saying that the company “would have to expel him by bullets” to get him to leave Marmato. Two days later, on September 1st 2011, he was shot dead while traveling on his motorcycle on a country road. Investigations have been inconclusive, but many suspect that he was targeted for his opposition to the open pit mining project. In a country where human rights defenders frequently come under attack and where the lines between corporate, state and paramilitary forces are often blurry, this is not implausible.

Concerned by the rising tensions and by their lack of power and recourses, Marmato residents invited the Colombia Support Network, a US-based solidarity organization, to bring a delegation of Canadians and Americans to Marmato in January 2012. The delegates chosen were:

·Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, a highly respected Roman Catholic bishop and peace activist from Detroit.

·John Laun, a lawyer, professor and expert on free trade agreements.

· David Newby, president of the Wisconsin AFL/CIO, the largest federation of unions in the United States.

·Paul Webster, an award winning Canadian journalist who has published in the Globe and Mail, the Toronto Star, the Lancet, and Reader’s Digest.

·And myself, Brittany Lambert, coordinator of the Americas Policy Group at the Canadian Council for International Cooperation.

The delegation took place from January 14th-22nd 2012 and involved meetings in Marmato, Manizales (the provincial capital), and Bogotá. The goal was to enable delegates to observe the situation in Marmato first-hand and to forge lasting links with the community that would enable follow-up work in their respective countries. It was also hoped that the presence of international delegates would facilitate meetings and dialogue between the small-scale miners and government officials or company executives. Unfortunately, it is often difficult for artisanal miners to secure such meetings on their own, given the power differentials between them and the upper spheres of society.

The next few blog postings will describe the delegation’s activities and findings, and reflect on possible solutions to the problem.

This blog post was written by Brittany Lambert, coordinator of CCIC's Americas Policy Group (APG).

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC, APG or their members.

The accountability gap just got a whole lot smaller

2012-01-26T14:50:00.009-05:00

Accountability. These days it seems to be an issue on everyone’s mind.

It forms part of the holy development trinity of results, transparency and accountability, so key to many donors’ agendas these days.

For a long time, the focus for donors on accountability was largely on the mutual accountability between themselves and partner governments – à la Paris Declaration. Since Busan, the focus has officially expanded to “the intended beneficiaries of our co‐operation, as well as to our respective citizens, organisations, constituents and shareholders.” It now makes up a central principle of all future development cooperation.

It has also long been a central tenet of the work of civil society organizations – who have long been pre-occupied with the mutual, multiple and multi-directional dimensions of accountability, as articulated most recently in the International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness.

So it was with great interest that a couple of weeks ago I attended a presentation by members of the Policy Action Group on Emergency Response (PAGER) on beneficiary accountability in humanitarian situations.

Since the mid 1990s – and in response to the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda – humanitarian organizations have established a range of codes of conduct to inform their actions – the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response (the “Sphere Project”), the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Code of Conduct, among others.

All were developed with a view to both enhancing the quality of humanitarian practice and the accountability of humanitarian actors to their constituents, donors and affected populations.

Within this context, the issue of really targeted beneficiary accountability is a relatively new one.

In humanitarian disasters, where hundreds of thousands of lives may be at stake, one might think that rights and obligations take less precedence. Not so. Groups firmly acknowledge that all communities and citizens are entitled to principled, quality, informed and appropriate services, regardless of the situation they are in.

But providing accountability in the context of a humanitarian disaster – with massive flooding, displacement, starvation – certainly poses tremendous challenges.

Oxfam Québec has been working with other Oxfam affiliates to introduce an innovative set of initiatives to get feedback on how their humanitarian interventions are rolling out and being perceived by their beneficiaries – with a view to improving their practice based on feedback and ultimately reporting back to complainants about what has been done to address their concerns.

In Haiti, where 85 percent of the population own a mobile phone, Oxfam set up a free phone line, “Line 400”, to receive complaints or feedback. They set up focus groups discussions, complaint boxes, information boards and community meetings, and encouraged interaction with staff.

Based on an evaluation of how the process went in the first phase – for example, “Line 400” was challenged by insufficient human resources to staff the call-line; the complaint boxes had no clear procedure for defining how complaints would be addressed; and it did not always prove easy to provide feedback on how complaints had been resolve – the project has moved into a second phase.

This is establishing clear guidelines for each of the accountability initiatives in terms of transparency, standards, and complaint handling, training to staff to be able to implement the initiatives, pursuing processes to actively engage beneficiaries in the design and implementation, and constant evaluation with a view to continual improvement.

The Canadian Red Cross is also in the process of designing and piloting its own beneficiary accountability framework.

It has hired a Beneficiary Accountability Advisor to do three key things:

· map what work other NGOs and Red Cross National Societies have done already in terms of developing accountability frameworks;

· recommend an accountability framework and set of guidelines for the Canadian Red Cross to pilot; and,

· identify and develop tools to implement the framework, and integrate it into the project cycle.

In terms of project cycle this means assessing situation specific needs through participatory tools, planning and designing projects that correspond to these needs, validating the project design through local beneficiaries to attest to the appropriateness of the design, implementing the design, and monitoring and evaluating outcomes with a view to continually improving their projects.

Since disasters challenge how easy it is to engage affected individuals in the process, the Red Cross has also thought through different levels of engagement (from information sharing and consultation, to delegating authority and controls to the communities over implementation and assessment) that are appropriate to the stage of the disaster (emergency, recovery, development).

And their approach to informing the communities about their programs is also creative, from posters and community theatre, to texting, community meetings and call-in radio.

We all know how essential accountability is to development. Who thought it could be so interesting and exciting as well?

This blog post was written by Fraser Reilly-King, Canadian Council for International Co-operation.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

Post-Busan – So much to do, so little time

2012-01-16T10:08:00.015-05:00

This past week, CCIC held a debrief on Busan and the outcomes of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) with a number of interested CCIC members, academics and a couple of government officials.

Overall the perceptions of what happened in Busan were positive. HLF4 moved the goal posts forward (or at least stayed the ground).

But with the agreement now in our pockets, it was the debate around what is going to differentiate Busan from Paris and Accra – and more practically what is going to need to happen in the next six months (not to mention the next year) – that is both raising eyebrows and blood pressure levels.

The discussion was heated, the debates stimulating, the questions challenging and thoughtful.

For example, with its voluntary principles on South-South cooperation firmly planted within a voluntary agreement, is China really in the tent? And will it live up to its promise to continue to engage in the process? And what precedent has this set for the future of South-South cooperation?

How can the private sector contribute to positive development outcomes, and what is the role for aid in this?

How will the role of CSOs outlined in the Busan Outcome Document (BOD) be interpreted and implemented by donors, in particular in the current reality of a disabling (not enabling) environment that still doesn’t leave organizations the space to fulfil that role?

And how will donors reconcile their own agendas and their current obsession with “results” with a shift to following “the priority needs of developing countries”, strengthening their capacity and country systems? In essence, if Busan was all about “global light, country heavy”, which country is “the heavy” – the donor or the partner country?

And perhaps most important to all of us, how is the Canadian International Development Agency going to implement all of the commitments made in Busan? While it is fastracking its private sector strategy, what are its plans for civil society with respect to the Istanbul Principles? And beyond policies, how will CIDA’s actual practice change as a result of Busan?

While the responses to all of these questions are still in their nascent stages – among both government and civil society – the outcomes of the next six to twelve months are going to provide a number of answers to those questions and to put the all essential “meat on the bones” of the BOD.

The analogy of “bones” is perhaps an apt one. The BOD is after all is just a framework, with few concrete commitments and a very long “to do” list for the next two years.

In December, two weeks after the Busan Outcome Document was published, the OECD put out a Room Document on what needs to be done to implement Busan.

By June 2012, the Busan Interim Group (the former Sherpa Group) leading this process needs to agree on the working arrangements for the Global Partnership on Effective Development (the successor to the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness), on the all-important global level indicators and framework for monitoring the BOD, and on the institutional arrangements for a joint OECD-UNDP secretariat to support the Partnership.

Here the Canadian government and CCIC both have an important role to play – CCIC is an active member of BetterAid, who is represented on the Busan Interim Group that will steer the process up until June; and Canada, who had to take a back seat to the UK Sherpa at the negotiations in Busan, has managed to get itself a seat at the table under the CANZ grouping (Canada, Australia, New Zealand).

But the list doesn’t end there. 2012 will also see donors doing the following: review plans to untie aid; implement common standards to publish timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on aid allocations; develop principles and guidelines to reduce the proliferation of multilateral and global funds; agree on principles that address countries that receive insufficient assistance; and review how further authority can be delegated to the field.

They also have to move forward on a range of things related to the eight “official” building blocks to come out of Busan: the action plan on statistics, country level results and accountability agreements, the gender action plan, indicators around the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, priority actions to enhance cooperation between the public and private sectors, and public schedules for those – like Canada – who signed on to the International Aid Transparency Initiative.

And then there is still the work of the “unofficial” building blocks, for example on enabling environment and rights based approaches to development. (I think I have made my point.)

So it is perhaps no surprise that many of us left Monday’s meeting (not to mention HLF4) with mixed emotions – the promise of what it could be, with a distinct feeling that the jury is still out on what it actually will be.

And let’s not forget that even when the judgement comes down one year on from Busan – when many of these things will hopefully be in place – that is just the start of the process. After all, any commitment or plan is nothing if it doesn’t translate into action that somehow improves the lives and the livelihoods of the poorest and most marginalized.

This blog post was written by Fraser Reilly-King, Canadian Council for International Co-operation.

Le défi mondial d’éliminer la pauvreté et l’injustice : seule l’action collective peut transformer nos vœux en réalité (deuxième partie). *

2012-01-05T11:10:00.001-05:00

En 2008, le Conseil canadien pour la coopération internationale et ses membres adoptaient un programme en 10 points visant à s’attaquer aux causes profondes de la pauvreté et de l’injustice dans le monde. Ce programme présentait une vision de la société civile canadienne quant à la façon dont le Canada peut jouer un rôle décisif pour aider à mettre un terme à la pauvreté et à l’injustice.

Trois ans plus tard ce plan d’action demeure, plus que jamais, d’actualité. Au début d’une année qui s’annonce pleine de défis pour les organisations internationales et nationales impliquées dans le développement international, je vous en présente les grandes lignes, comme un appel renouvelé à serrer les rangs et à redoubler d’ardeur pour que les priorités de ce plan deviennent réalité.

6) Promouvoir la paix

Les violations des droits de la personne, toujours présentes en temps de guerre, ont atteint ces dernières années des sommets sans précédent. Le ciblage de civils, les déplacements forcés des populations, les violences sexuelles et sexospécifiques (y compris le viol en tant qu’arme de guerre), l’engagement forcé des enfants soldats, les exécutions sommaires et les disparitions sont chose courante.

On estime également que le nombre de morts indirectes pour cause de maladie, de malnutrition, d’eau non potable et d’absence de soins médicaux est de dix fois supérieur à celui des morts liées au combat.

Le Canada doit s’engager beaucoup plus fermement en faveur du maintien de la paix. Il faut accorder la priorité aux droits fondamentaux des civils touchés par la guerre, et instaurer des mesures particulières pour protéger les droits des jeunes et des femmes.

Il faut également mettre un terme à l’impunité dont jouissent les personnes impliquées dans des crimes de guerre, des crimes contre l’humanité, des génocides et d’autres violations du droit humanitaire international, et supporter l’adoption d’un traité relatif au commerce des armes.

7) Promouvoir la justice environnementale dans le monde

C’est en Australie, aux États-Unis et au Canada que les émissions de gaz à effet de serre par habitant sont les plus élevées – deux fois plus que celles de l’Union européenne (UE), six fois plus que celles de la Chine et treize fois plus que celles de l’Inde.

Le laxisme du Canada en matière de lutte aux changements climatiques et le retrait récent du protocole de Kyoto laissent craindre le pire pour les années à venir, particulièrement pour les populations les plus vulnérables.

Le mouvement mondial en faveur de la justice environnementale soutient que les pays industrialisés ont une dette particulière envers les populations du Sud, dont la valeur équivaut à des décennies de pillage des ressources, de dommages à l’environnement, de destruction de la biodiversité, de rejet de déchets et de changements climatiques. Les pays pauvres sont les plus touchés par la dégradation et l’effondrement de l’environnement car ils dépendent directement de celui-ci pour leurs aliments, leur eau, leurs matériaux de construction et leurs combustibles.

Nous devons continuer à plaider pour une plus grande justice dans la répartition du fardeau des changements climatiques et pour des pratiques d’investissement et de commerce avec les pays en développement qui passent le test de la viabilité écologique.

8) Appuyer la gouvernance démocratique et la citoyenneté mondiale

Les organisations de la société civile canadiennes (OSC), de concert avec leurs homologues du Sud, sont reconnues comme des acteurs essentiels pour un développement efficace. Pourtant, l’espace et le rôle des OSC partout dans le monde tendent à régresser, avec un mouvement accru vers la concentration du pouvoir entre les mains des gouvernements.

Le Canada doit renforcer ses propres formules de participation de la société civile à la prise de décisions et à l’élaboration des politiques. Du même coup, il doit s’engager à conférer un plus grand rôle au Parlement, à ses députés et à ses comités pour définir la politique internationale, faire progresser les droits de la personne et mettre un terme à la pauvreté mondiale.

Notre politique en matière d’aide et de développement doit reconnaître le rôle décisif des OSC, du Nord et du Sud, dans le développement démocratique, la défense des droits de la personne, la prestation efficace de l’aide et l’élimination de la pauvreté.

9) Instaurer un système multilatéral démocratique et efficace

Des problèmes à portée mondiale tels que les changements climatiques et la pauvreté endémique nécessitent une prise de décisions mondiale efficace. Toutefois, le système multilatéral a mal vieilli et n’a pas su s’adapter aux problèmes du monde émergent. Or, les institutions multilatérales reflètent les relations de pouvoir à l’échelle internationale. Les gouvernements du Sud exercent moins d’influence que leurs homologues du Nord, peu importe la tribune.

Le CCCI et de nombreux gouvernements et OSC du Sud demandent à la fois un soutien urgent pour sauver les actions multilatérales et une réforme en profondeur des institutions multilatérales pour régler les déséquilibres de pouvoir qui nuisent à leur efficacité et à leur crédibilité.

10) Optimiser et accroître l’aide

La pauvreté revêt de nombreux visages et a de nombreuses causes. Cela dit, la qualité de l’aide devient un facteur aussi important que sa quantité pour éliminer la pauvreté. Il faut porter attention aux deux dimensions.

Le budget fédéral 2012-2013 marquera la deuxième année d’une période de plafonnement de l’enveloppe d’aide internationale canadienne à cinq milliards de dollars, période qui devrait durer quatre ans. Avec ce plafonnement, l’APD se chiffrera à environ 5,44 milliards de dollars en 2012-2013, soit 0,30 % du revenu national brut (RNB) canadien, une diminution par rapport à 2010-2011 (0,37 %). D’ici 2014, on s’attend à ce que le ratio soit de 0,28 %, l’un des plus bas parmi les 22 donateurs officiels.

L’aide ne réglera pas à elle seule le problème de la pauvreté mondiale; la réforme des institutions multilatérales, les règles commerciales et les manœuvres en matière d’environnement durable ont toutes un rôle à jouer. Toutefois, si le Canada veut faire sa part pour atteindre les Objectifs du Millénaire pour le développement de l’ONU, il doit porter attention tant à la quantité qu’à la qualité de son aide.

(* ce texte s’inspire largement du document « Le défi mondial d’éliminer la pauvreté et l’injustice : un programme canadien en 10 points ». La 1ère partie du texte a été publiée le 21 décembre 2011)

Chantal Havard est agente de communication et de relations avec le gouvernement au CCCI.

Le défi mondial d’éliminer la pauvreté et l’injustice : seule l’action collective peut transformer nos vœux en réalité (première partie)*

2011-12-21T12:20:00.000-05:00

Trois ans plus tard ce plan d’action demeure, plus que jamais, d’actualité. A la fin d’une année mouvementée pour les organisations internationales et nationales impliquées dans le développement international, je vous en présente les grandes lignes, comme un appel renouvelé à serrer les rangs et à redoubler d’ardeur pour que les priorités de ce plan deviennent réalité.

1) Promouvoir les droits des femmes et l’égalité des sexes

Toutes les statistiques le confirment : à l’échelle planétaire, les femmes sont beaucoup plus touchées par la pauvreté, l’exclusion et l’analphabétisme. Les femmes n’ont pas les mêmes possibilités que les hommes de façonner le développement social, politique et économique et d’y participer.

Le Canada a réduit radicalement le financement versé au mouvement des femmes ainsi qu’à la recherche et au plaidoyer. La situation est semblable dans le reste du monde. Nous devons renverser la tendance si nous tenons vraiment à instaurer l’égalité entre les sexes. Les mesures du Canada doivent comprendre un soutien considérable aux organisations de défense des droits de femmes, ainsi qu’une attention explicite aux inégalités entre les sexes dans l’ensemble des initiatives internationales en matière de diplomatie, d’aide, de commerce et de défense.

2) Promouvoir la santé et l’éducation pour tous

Toutes les personnes ont le droit à l’éducation et à la meilleure santé physique et mentale possible. La santé et l’instruction sont des préalables nécessaires à l’élimination de la pauvreté et à l’exercice de tous les autres droits.

Les experts reconnaissent que la santé, la pauvreté et l’éducation sont inextricablement liés. La dégradation de l’environnement et la pollution ont également un impact négatif sur la santé.

La population canadienne a accès à des services de santé et d’éducation universels, financés par l’État, et les apprécie (bien que des remises en question inquiétantes aient cours récemment) . Nos politiques d’aide internationale doivent appuyer l’accès à de tels services de qualité dans les pays en développement. Le Canada doit aussi agir comme chef de file pour exclure des accords commerciaux les services sociaux tels que la santé, l’éducation et l’eau potable.

3) Promouvoir le droit à l’alimentation et assurer des moyens de subsistance viables aux producteurs d’aliments dans les pays en développement

Une alimentation convenable pour tous constitue un droit des plus fondamentaux. Or, les aliments sont devenus une simple marchandise régie par les lois du marché. La moitié des personnes les plus affamées au monde sont en fait des producteurs agricoles, surtout des femmes.

La géographie de la faim est le reflet de l’iniquité des règles commerciales et d’une industrialisation mondiale de l’agriculture qui prive les petits exploitants agricoles de leurs droits.

Le Canada devrait plaider en faveur de règles commerciales plus équitables qui mettent un terme aux subventions injustes, préservent les marchés locaux, et ouvrent les marchés du Nord aux producteurs du Sud. Notre aide devrait privilégier des initiatives fondées sur les connaissances et les méthodes écologiques des agriculteurs locaux, plutôt que des solutions techniques venues d’ailleurs.

4) Bâtir un monde de justice économique

Chaque année, des centaines de milliards de dollars affluent des pays pauvres vers les pays riches sous forme de remboursement de la dette et de bénéfices pour le secteur privé ainsi que par l’entremise du commerce inéquitable et de la fuite de capitaux. Ces sommes sont de loin supérieures à celles de l’aide internationale octroyée aux pauvres.

Au nord comme au sud, de plus en plus d’acteurs de la société civile s’opposent à une mondialisation économique qui favorise les riches (comme nous l’avons vu cette année notamment avec le mouvement des indignés). Ils plaident en faveur d’une approche de l’économie mondiale fondée sur la justice, qui accorde la priorité aux droits de la personne, et à la réforme des institutions financières internationales.

Il faut revoir en profondeur le système financier international et mettre en œuvre de nouveaux moyens pour financer le développement : taxation et redistribution de la richesse, optimisation des bénéfices publics tirés de l’investissement étranger, lutte contre la corruption, etc.

5) Assurer la responsabilisation des entreprises

La première obligation de l’État, soit de faire respecter les droits fondamentaux de ses citoyens, cède maintenant souvent le pas à ses intérêts de défendre les droits des entreprises.

Les populations sont de plus en plus conscientes du fait que les sociétés du Nord ne respectent pas les mêmes normes à l’étranger que dans leur propre pays : les exemples de compagnies canadiennes implantées dans des pays en développement et aux pratiques environnementales et sociales douteuses se sont multipliées ces dernières années. L’adhésion des entreprises à des codes de bonne conduite volontaires n’a pas donné de résultats probants.

La société civile réclame que la responsabilité des entreprises soit obligatoire et réglementée, tant à l’échelle nationale qu’internationale, conformément aux normes internationales en matière de droits de la personne et de l’environnement.

(* ce texte s’inspire largement du document « Le défi mondial d’éliminer la pauvreté et l’injustice : un programme canadien en 10 points ». La 2^e partie du texte sera publiée la première semaine de janvier 2012)

Chantal Havard est agente de communication et de relations avec le gouvernement au CCCI.

Towards a New and Improved Americas Strategy for Canada?

2011-12-14T13:40:00.003-05:00

In July 2007, the Prime Minister launched Canada’s “Re-engagement in the Americas” strategy. At the time, no policy document on the Americas Strategy was made available, nor were there any substantive opportunities for civil society engagement and comment. CCIC’s Americas Policy Group (APG) was left to piece together this elusive “Americas Strategy” by reviewing speeches, statements, political appointments and visits in the region.

Four years later, in October 2011, DFAIT decided to “review and renew” the Americas Strategy and approached the APG for input. DFAIT recognized that the original Americas Strategy had been somewhat haphazard and designed without sufficient input from civil society organizations. We were assured that the process would be different this time and were invited to participate in a series of consultations on Canada’s engagement in the Americas.

We were not sure whether to be pleased or skeptical. Would our participation help give credibility to their consultation process and imply that that we endorsed the final product – even if it didn’t reflect our views? Was this a worthwhile use of our sector’s already over-stretched time?

Despite these doubts, it seemed contradictory to turn down the opportunity after having criticized the government for its failure to consult civil society the first time around. We therefore agreed to participate in the process and to wait before making any definitive statements on its merits or demerits.

The consultations held thus far have been encouraging at times and discouraging at others. We are receiving signals that the government’s priorities in the Americas differ from our own. In a consultation on October 31st, Allan Culham (DFAIT’s DG of Hemispheric Affairs and Permanent Representative to the OAS) rejoiced at the free trade agreement with Colombia, pointed to Canada and Colombia’s robust trade numbers, and failed to mention human rights at all until prompted. The APG would have preferred to see him adopt a more nuanced approach to the trade deal, one that acknowledged the potential for Colombian lives and livelihoods to be affected by the scramble for metals and land, and one that took seriously the annual Human Rights Impact Assessment that both governments have agreed to conduct.

The consultation was nonetheless encouraging to the extent that many civil society organizations spoke up and voiced concerns similar to our own. Representatives from numerous Canadian civil society organizations called on the government to pay more attention to marginalized groups, to consider the root causes of organized crime and to improve Canadian extractive companies’ human rights and environmental record in the Americas.

A December 6th dialogue with Diane Ablonczy (Minister of State of Foreign Affairs, Americas & Consular Affairs) signaled, once again, that the government’s priorities in the Americas differ from our own. The panelists (12 men and 1 woman) were mainly business-oriented, and there was more discussion of how to compete with China for investments in the Americas than talk of human rights or equitable development. An Export Development Canada panelist stated that they key to Canada’s success in the region was its ability to “import labour without moving it” – in other words, to make full use of the cheap labour available in Latin America. The APG would have liked to hear a more nuanced statement: one that was accompanied by a recognition that the pursuit of cheap labour at all costs can be a slippery slope, especially in contexts where the right to unionize is severely constricted.

DFAIT has also asked for written input on Canada’s engagement with the Americas, and the APG has agreed to submit its recommendations. We will continue to promote an Americas Strategy that is based on respect for the full spectrum of human rights for all citizens of the hemisphere - an Americas Strategy that leaves no one behind. The civil society voices we heard at the October 31st consultation with Allan Culham suggest that others want the same thing. We hope that our participation in this process will encourage the government to think about these issues and include them in its Strategy. If the government is serious about putting together a new, improved and inclusive strategy for the Americas, it should.

This blog post was written by Brittany Lambert, coordinator of CCIC's Americas Policy Group (APG).

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC, APG or its members.

Gauging the temperature of the new Global Partnership: Take Two

2011-12-03T11:38:00.001-05:00

It was a relief to finally walk along the beach this morning, and feel the sand give way beneath my feet – something real after eight consecutive days of heady discussions and negotiations with government officials and among ourselves.

Looking back on the city from a vantage point on the rocks, you could see storm clouds in the distance retreating behind Busan’s rolling hills and its metallic-coloured skyscrapers, tall fingers of glass trying to poke a hole in the sky. In the distance, out on the edge of the sea, soft misty clouds blur the horizon.

A day earlier, Angel Gurria, the Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Brian Atwood, the Chair of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, and Talaat Abdel-Malek, the Chair of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), were all patting themselves on the back for a “job well done”.

The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation is indeed in many ways a landmark accomplishment. It has extended the tent to a broader range of development actors – including emerging economies, the private sector, and civil society – and framed an agenda for aid and development effectiveness going forward. Furthermore, Mexico, Brazil and South Africa genuinely seem committed to the full partnership, having committed themselves to it before China rejoined the negotiations, but downgraded its own status within the framework and the principles of “South-South cooperation” to a purely “voluntary” arrangement.

This is unfortunate as it means a slow boat for China to real aid and development effectiveness. But then it was always the prerogative of the OECD and many of the donors to get China in the tent, and at any price. They paid it, it would seem.

On the flip side, if China even shows a little more commitment to Busan than the traditional donors have shown to Paris and Accra, they will already be ahead of the game.

Busan also established an important set of principles for all development actors that are “consistent with our agreed international commitments on human rights, decent work, gender equality, environmental sustainability and disability,” and move beyond Paris in important ways. Ownership has a more democratic orientation, refocusing on countries instead of just states – and sets out a more inclusive role for all development actors, including parliaments, local governments and CSOs in shaping development policy. And while the Busan Partnership may still focus on “results”, again its orientation is longer term, looking at outcomes that have “a lasting impact on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality.” Transparency and accountability also goes beyond an inter donor-government relationship, to accountability to intended beneficiaries and respective citizens.

In terms of specifics, the use of country systems is now the default option, the International Aid Transparency Initiative got a big boost of support, and gender equality and women’s empowerment made some important advances. Most importantly for civil society, the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness, and the rights-based approaches of civil society to development, found international recognition – even from US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, during the official opening. The enabling environment now has some link to “agreed international rights”, although how this new language will curb the current sway towards a disabling environment in many country contexts is unclear. Finally by extending the life of the WP-EFF until June, CSOs have an opportunity to shape the future aid architecture, and the all important indicators and monitoring framework for Busan.

A number of other issues – like tied aid and aid predictability – stayed the course.

Where Busan fell short was on acknowledging the lack of implementation of Paris and Accra and the all essential follow-up to Busan, the vision for the private sector, fragile states and the gender action plan. As noted elsewhere on this blog, one of the key elements of the Paris Declaration was the inclusion of a set of indicators and a monitoring framework for tracking progress on implementation. This has illustrated how donors have largely failed to realize their commitments to Paris. And this has caused some scepticism about their ability to live up to Busan’s commitments, underscoring the importance of defining indicators and a monitoring framework for the Partnership, a decision deferred until June 2012.

Similarly, CSOs feel that donors need to focus on this “unfinished business” before they turn their attention to “big business”. A year after Seoul’s Development Consensus for Shared Growth, Busan not surprisingly places economic growth and the private sector at the heart of development, instead of the other way around. And while the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” has won broad support among more than 40 governments, fragile states are essentially getting a “raw deal”, with peace-building a wholly state-centric, rather than people-centred, process. Without a clear indicators and a monitoring framework, implementation will be a challenge.

But beyond the specific text, civil society has its own accomplishments of which to be proud.

At the opening of the Busan Global Civil Society Forum, Tony Tujan, the Chair of BetterAid and the CSO Sherpa at the negotiations, acknowledged that we of course want something from the Partnership that fulfils our demands. But beyond that, “whatever comes out of Busan, we want it to recognize our role as independent development actors that belong in an inclusive global partnership for development.”

For the past three years, we have been fighting to have a seat at the table and keep that seat. We have not been given much space, but in that space, and throughout the fierce negotiations, our critical but constructive statements, and our thoughtful interventions, we have gone one step further. We will still have to fight for that seat, but now at least many more governments hopefully recognize why we deserve a seat at the table.

“CSOs are a vibrant and essential feature in the democratic life of countries across the globe playing a vital role in advancing development effectiveness in order to achieve human rights, gender equality, social justice, decent work, environmental sustainability, peace and an end to corruption and impunity within a solid framework of democratic governance, rights-based approaches, and inclusive policy engagement,” said Emele Duituturaga, Co-Chair of the Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness, in her speech at the closing plenary.

“We have truly valued our inclusion as equals at the HLF4 negotiating table and expect this practice to be replicated at national levels.”

It is a goal worth shooting for.

My thoughts come back to the beach in Busan, and somebody tells me it is snowing back in Ottawa. I hope the ground hasn’t frozen over yet.

This blog post was written by Fraser Reilly-King, Canadian Council for International Co-operation.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

A happy ending in Busan? Take One

2011-12-01T12:50:00.002-05:00

In contrast to the rather mild weather that characterized the first two days of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4), the final day was met with a cold, rainy morning – gloomy to be sure, pathetic fallacy maybe. After all, the final day held the promise of a new Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and participants descended on Bexco – the HLF4 venue – eager to see how the final act would play out in Busan.

And how did it all end? Was HLF4 a comedy? A tragedy? Well, perhaps that depends on your perspective. Participants spent the final day discussing the post-Busan agenda and topped it off with a closing ceremony where – with much fanfare and self-congratulation – delegates highlighted important gains and how they will take the outcome document forward.

And what are the important gains? Here’s my take:

Transparency: the Busan Outcome Document (BOD) makes transparency and accountability one of the shared principles for all development partners. Participants agreed to implement “a common, open standard for electronic publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on resources provided through development co-operation [...] with the aim of implementing it fully by December 2015.” In addition, countries like the United States and Canada, as well as donors such as the Inter-American Development Bank and International Fund for Agricultural Development have signed on to the International Aid Transparency Initiative, which aims to make information about aid spending easier to find, use and compare.

New Deal for Fragile States: a “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” was struck in Busan committing parties that endorsed to “support inclusive country led and country owned transitions out of fragility based on a country-led fragility assessment developed by the g7+ [group of fragile and conflict affected states] with the support of international partners, a country-led one vision and one plan, a country compact to implement the plan, using the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) to monitor progress, and support inclusive and participatory political dialogue.” This New Deal was welcomed in the BOD.

Enabling Environment for Civil Society: While civil society would have liked to see more gains in the BOD on, for example, broad commitment to the rights-based approach and more recognition on the lack of progress against Paris and Accra, CSOs successfully negotiated the inclusion of reference to international rights in relation to commitments on an enabling environment – a key ask for civil society. The final BOD reads that governments will “implement fully respective commitments to enable CSOs to exercise their roles as independent development actors, with a particular focus on an enabling environment, consistent with agreed international rights, that maximises the contributions of CSOs to development.”

Of course, there are also areas of mixed success.

Enlarging the tent: A goal for HLF4 was to develop a Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Organizers wanted to broaden the number of actors engaged in aid effectiveness discussions, bringing Southern providers of development assistance and private sector actors into the fold. Countries like China, India and Brazil have endorsed the shared principles in the BOD, effectively enlarging the tent from what was historically a traditional donor driven agenda. However, this victory is bittersweet as these countries have not signed on to any specific commitments. Nevertheless, this success has prompted the Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, Brian Atwood to shout from the rooftops that the OECD is no longer a “rich men’s club.” He later suggested that future meetings of the Global Partnership – which is to be an inclusive, representative body that oversees the commitments made in Busan at the global level – could be held in conjunction with OECD DAC High Level Ministerial Meetings. The irony of this suggestion, following on the heels of his earlier statement, was not lost on this blogger.

Beyond Aid: The BOD broadened the aid effectiveness agenda to development cooperation. While it references the role of the private sector, south-south cooperation and triangular cooperation, combating corruption and illicit flows, and climate change finance, it does not spell out a broad agenda for better policy coherence for development. In other words, it does not challenge the systemic problems facing developing countries, such as, for example, unfair trade policies on agriculture subsidies and non-tariff barriers, or work to better facilitate the transfer of remittances from developed countries to the developing world – key challenges facing developing countries whose solution would greatly benefit development efforts. But then again, maybe movement on these issues is too much to expect from a High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. Nevertheless, the agenda has broadened, and this should be welcomed. Perhaps it represents the first step towards putting these systemic issues on the table.

So how will these gains be taken forward?

The outcome document essentially discusses the post-Busan agenda in two ways, first in terms of how commitments will be monitored and evaluated, and secondly, in terms of the institutional makeup that will oversee these processes. At this point, participants have essentially agreed to agree later on both fronts, and there seems to be little urgency in terms of taking these important commitments forward. Nevertheless the outcome document provides some general guidance in both areas.

Participants in Busan have extended a lifeline to the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), which has historically overseen the high level process and monitoring of commitments, and whose mandate was supposed to be up in Busan. On the issue of indicators, by June 2012, the WP-EFF will decide on how commitments are monitored and evaluated at the global level. Monitoring and evaluation at the country level will be decided through nationally-led multi-stakeholder processes. Indeed, the mantra of the post-Busan agenda has become “global light, country heavy.” Participants have agreed to develop a selective and relevant set of indicators and targets to monitor progress at the global level – the bulk of their focus however, will be at the country level.

And who will oversee the monitoring and evaluation process?

The BOD commits participants to a “new, inclusive and representative Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation to support and ensure accountability for the implementation of commitments at the political level.” The sentiment in Busan is that the lack of progress on Paris and Accra is a result of little political support for the aid effectiveness agenda, as highlighted in CCIC’s blog on Day 1 of HLF4. In response, the BOD suggests that the Global Partnership will be characterized by regular ministerial-level engagement – this is a bid to develop and maintain political support for the BOD and its implementation. These meetings would be held in conjunction with other fora.

The outcome document also invites the UN Development Cooperation Forum – a multi-stakeholder forum within the UN that dialogues on issue relating to development cooperation – to play a role. It also refers to the OECD and the UNDP, which may play an important role in monitoring global and national commitments.

So, is Busan a comedy, tragedy or something else? Only time will tell, as the answer to this question is – like its predecessors in Paris and Accra – all in the implementation.

This blog post was written by Shannon Kindornay, The North-South Institute, and delegate to the Fourth High Level Forum.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

Getting the Busan Gender Plan back on the rights track

2011-11-30T14:31:00.003-05:00

What was to be a showcase announcement on gender equality at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness landed with a bit of a thud as women’s organizations from around the world gave the plan a cold shoulder.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton teamed up with the Korean government and several other countries – Canada included – to launch the Busan Joint Action Plan on Gender Equality and Development Wednesday. The keystone of the plan is EDGE which stands for Evidence and Data on Gender Equality – a much needed and welcome investment in the capacity of governments and institutions to collect and analyze data broken down by gender. This information is critical to good public policy, providing decision-makers with evidence and insights on how their actions or inaction are affecting women and girls differently than men and boys.

Nothing offensive about that. Indeed the only critique is how modest an initiative it is.

The target of the women’s movements’ scorn is the other element of the Busan plan, aimed at boosting support to women entrepreneurs. And here the concerns have more layers than an onion, each with the capacity to leave you in tears. On the surface is the focus on women as engines of economic growth. Everyone it seems is hot on women these days – the UN, the development banks, the aid agencies, the private sector. There’s not much money flowing their way but there’s lots of talk about women as a great untapped resource that, with more support, could spur tremendous growth within flagging economies.

There’s truth to that but cause for caution too. Women have every reason to be suspicious of yet another scheme that instrumentalizes women and girls for a broader objective rather than putting women’s rights at its centre.

Most development projects just ignore women. But too many create more work for women without creating more power, rights or respect for women.

Delegates to the Women’s Forum of the Busan Global Civil Society Forum recounted examples where micro-credit, community loans and other schemes simply added to the burden of women whose plates were full but were going hungry. Between their underpaid and unpaid work women already put in two-thirds of all the hours worked on the planet. Yet many are so desperate they jump at the chance to further indebt themselves, taking out micro-loans to start a business – in effect, a third or fourth job – even though too many of them have little control over the income they earn.

Lenders gladly loan them money – as long as the amount is small enough – confident the women will repay their debts. Socialization and community pressure mean default rates are very low, even when the cost to the women is very high.

Forum delegates note the dominant economic model is founded on women’s unpaid and underpaid work. The burgeoning care economy and the growth of precarious work that relies on a constantly replenished pool of young women workers were cited as examples of the sorts of entrepreneurship that was as likely to enslave as to empower women.

That women want more economic opportunity and freedom there is no doubt. That they want recognition for their many contributions to economic growth and legal status as owners of lands, homes and assets, of course. That they want decent work and opportunities to open and grow businesses, again, that’s true. But the women state unequivocally that the foundation for prosperity with equity is rights.

They believe it is naïve or disingenuous to promote the three E’s – education, employment and entrepreneurship – as the recipe to end inequality without tackling the attitudes and behaviours, customs and norms that perpetuate patriarchy. They underline too the need to address violence and child care and climate change and a wide range of issues that create vulnerability and inequality and represent systemic barriers to eradicating poverty. And they call for an initiative that is grounded in rights, that starts with the Beijing agenda and that engages women’s organizations from the outset in the conception and design of the proposal as well as its delivery and assessment. Is the Busan Joint Action Plan dead? No, not yet. While early reviews were negative, no doubt some women’s groups will test USAID’s expressed openness to dialogue. And were the engagement genuine and the resulting plan rights-based, comprehensive and ambitious, there could yet be enthusiasm for this venture. [And were the US to ratify CEDAW, Secretary Clinton would have more credibility as its champion.]

As for Canada, it will be important that CIDA take an active role in the reframing of this initiative. Sustainable economic growth has been identified as a priority by the government. While the details of the strategy remain under wraps, we can only hope that women’s economic empowerment is central. And if so, a new, improved Busan plan might be the perfect means to leverage Canada’s investment to have the kind of results that all women will welcome.

This blog post was written by Robert Fox, Executive Director of Oxfam Canada and delegate to the High Level Forum.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

Progress since Paris? Clearly not enough

2011-11-29T10:37:00.001-05:00

At last the countdown to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) is over. Governments and the sherpas are finalizing the draft Outcome Document, and civil society, represented in greater numbers than ever before, have completed their “Statement” on the draft Document. The stage is set for tomorrow’s formal opening.

As HLF4 gets underway, several donors, Canada included, have signed on to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) just in time for some media friendly back-slapping and hand shaking. While the addition of new donors to IATI – which aims to make information about aid spending easier to find, use and compare – is welcome (and Canadian CSOs have certainly applauded Canada’s efforts), participants have been less optimistic about post-Busan as they look back on progress since Paris and Accra, the focus of Day 1.

And what kind of progress has there been? Well - not much. Indeed, with the release of the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, the Independent Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration and The Reality of Aid Special Report on civil society perspectives on progress since Paris in the lead up to HLF4, participants meeting in Busan are quite aware that with a few exceptions, the Paris Process has failed to deliver on its promise of better aid. All three evaluations of the Paris process have shown that, although the aid effectiveness agenda has had some impact on the way aid is delivered, there has been a lack of political will to ensure the full implementation of the Paris Principles and the Accra Agenda for Action.

The 2011 Monitoring Survey demonstrated sobering results. At the global level, only one of the 13 targets established for 2010 to measure the implementation of aid effectiveness commitments has been met, and just barely. Progress has varied across donors, and in some areas, such as reducing aid fragmentation and proliferation, there has been a backsliding. Indeed, Brian Atwood, Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (read, “important person at HLF4”), actually stated that given the lack of progress on reducing aid fragmentation and proliferation - a donor commitment - we should be careful about how optimistic we are with respect to future improvements (a statement which he later retracted - apparently the optics are bad when the Chair of the OECD-DAC says there is little hope).

Indeed, the monitoring survey highlighted little or no progress on aid predictability and the implementation of donor commitments to common arrangements and procedures. Developing countries, on the other hand, have fared better, meeting many of their commitments, such as putting in place sound national development strategies and in some cases national results frameworks.

The Independent Evaluation of the Paris Declaration also found that donors were slower to implement their commitments than developing countries, despite the fact that the expected changes for them were more demanding. According to the report, “donors and agencies have so far demonstrated less commitment than partner countries to making the necessary changes in their own systems.” Nevertheless, the report found that the aid effectiveness process was important in generating norms of good practice, improving the quality of a number of aid partnerships, and relevant to improving aid processes, at least in theory.

While these evaluations were important to monitoring the implementation of Paris commitments, civil society identified a significant gap in the instruments, namely a failure to adequately measure the impact of the aid effectiveness agenda on democratic ownership and development effectiveness.

As a result, the Reality of Aid network (RoA) produced a Special Report looking at progress on the following: creating multi-stakeholder bodies and effective consultative processes to prioritize and monitor development policies; developing an enabling environment for civil society; producing transparency and access to information so as to inform accountability; and formulating poverty indicators that suggest outcomes for poor and vulnerable people.

Like the Monitoring Survey and the Independent Evaluation, RoA found that the aid effectiveness agenda has produced some positives, particularly with limited improvements in the relationships between developing countries and international cooperation partners. It found little evidence, however, of improvements in democratic ownership, highlighting that ownership over the development process has yet to move much beyond the executive arm of government, with a few exceptions. Finally, the RoA concluded that there is a shrinking space for civil society, with issues around transparency remaining, and little or no progress on corruption through independent investigation, legal redress and action (a finding shared both by the Survey and the Evaluation).

So, given the results of these evaluations, what are participants saying in Busan?

CSOs and a limited number of donor governments, including the Danes, the Finns and, believe it or not, the new Italian government are saying that development is not only about economic growth, but “first and foremost it is about fulfilling the rights and needs of people.” More specifically, civil society is insisting that HLF4 results in development policies and practices that are rights-based, that guarantee space for civil society organisations and other non-state actors “in keeping with binding commitments outlined in international and regional instruments that guarantee fundamental rights, and ensure private sector involvement actually contributes to development, while respecting international labour standards and conventions.” The rights of women and girls continue to be neglected. At the same time tied aid (though there have been improvements, 21% remains tied), accountability, and conditionality remain serious challenges.

So, while the results have on the whole been disappointing and there is recognition that global conditions and the development context have changed for the worse, there is nonetheless a general acknowledgement that the development community should not be distracted from the Paris and Accra agenda. Instead we should begin to frame development challenges in the light of a new global context and the need to reach the poorest and most marginalized on the basis of international human rights frameworks.

This blog post was written by Joe Ingram and Shannon Kindornay, The North-South Institute. Both are delegates to the High Level Forum.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

Taking our seat at the table – how civil society “got its act together” to influence the Busan outcome

2011-11-28T07:34:00.002-05:00

Yesterday evening I said good-bye to my fellow “Team Canada” colleagues as we walked back from a meeting with some members of the CIDA delegation, here for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) (HLF4) in Busan. The Busan Global Civil Society Forum (BCSF) is over and today the HLF-4 begins with the full participation of 300 civil society delegates, along-side donors and partner governments.

The BCSF brought together more than 500 participants from civil society, from all corners of the world, for three days of intense discussions in preparation for the HLF4. Updates were given about where the negotiation process stood, decisions were made about the bottom lines for civil society as the civil society (CSO) Sherpa, Tony Tujan, walked into what we thought was the last negotiation session before the HLF, and the CSO team strategized along thematic and regional lines as to how best to push the CSO key asks during the upcoming 3 days.

This morning, the news was not good. Sherpas had a long night and did not managed to come to an agreement that met the minimal bottom-lines of all parties. So the tussle continues. Very significantly, China seems to have withdrawn from the process, and other countries, including France, were conspicuously absent on the last critical Sherpa meeting before the HLF-4 kicked off. And these are just the highlights, much more going on below the surface and behind closed doors.

Easy to feel concerned about the outcome of the next three days of meetings - like any global negotiation, the issues at play here are complex and multi-dimensional, and the number and diversity of actors with high stakes and divergent interests daunting.

But let’s take a look at the highlights of the process so far, from a civil society perspective, to take strength in what we have to build on.

There is no doubt that we have come a long way since Accra, and have lived up to the challenges posed to us since then in unequivocal and creative ways. Who could have assured us, in the lead-up to Busan, when civil society groups rallied to get a formal recognition in the outcome document (the Accra Agenda for Action – AAA) that at the next high level forum we would be included as development actors in our own right and that we would have a seat at the table – at the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, the Working Party Executive Committee, the many multi-stakeholder clusters and task teams, with our own Sherpa and with 300 official delegates at the forum itself.

This is without question an unprecedented experience for civil society – one from which we will no doubt draw many valuable lessons as we move forward into new challenges, in this process and other fields. As I have come to understand the enormity of the achievements over the last three years in this regard, I have been struck by how in many ways this experience is counter-current to the shrinking of space for civil society that we are observing around the globe.

So, how did civil society get this seat at the table and how did we use it?

First, Better Aid. This broad global platform of CSOs, lead by southern organizations, has been the face of civil society in the process and has been the process via which we have produced common asks and negotiation positions - through a governance structure that has attempted to be as inclusive and democratic as possible, while being functional and efficient. Not an easy task, when you have hundreds of organizations from all over the world (more than 1700), that speak different languages, have different readings of the world and priorities, and different abilities and interests in the matter at hand. Brian Tomlison, Executive Director of AidWatch Canada and until recently Senior Policy Advisor with CCIC, says that “there is a respect that unites us all and does not undermine but rather strengthens all of our agendas”.


Brian Tomlinson (AidWatch Canada) in Busan

Second, The Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness. A process designed to respond to the challenge of establishing our own standards for effective development of CSOs, the Open Forum brought together more than 3,500 organizations from all regions of the world through consultations in over 70 countries. The outcomes: The Istanbul Principles and the International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness.

Third, through the combined efforts of Better Aid and The Open Forum, CSOs arrived in Busan last week with a clear set of key asks for Busan. “It has been at times difficult, but we managed to unify and come to Busan with a collective voice”, says Emele Duituturaga, Executive Director of PIANGO and co-chair of the Open Forum. “Through this process, we have learned to dialogue and go forward as one.”

Brian Tomlinson adds, “though it is not bullet proof, a highlight of this whole process has been the unity of civil society in the face of a very complex agenda with diverse special interests. We have come to HLF4 with a common set of bottom lines which are strongly rooted in a human rights approach to development”.

It is without any doubt, the combination of having produced our own standards for development effectiveness and our common key asks that have allowed for CSOs to be instrumental, in the lead-up process to HLF4, to not losing sight of the most important issue – better development outcomes for the poor and marginalized around the world. Through its participation in the numerous multi-stakeholder platforms that worked to prepare the ground for Busan, CSOs were able to make important contributions to increase the ambition in the Busan Outcome Document (BOD), and this has been broadly recognized. “We have transformed the process,” says Emele, “and this is how we will transform the world”.

But as I leave, I also reflect on the many challenges that lie ahead for global civil society. It was not an easy or quick process to come up with a statement at the end of the BCSF. But after a couple of hours of group discussions and then plenary discussions, and finally a committee review, we had a statement that synthesized the top concerns of the participants of the forum. So we still have work to do on how to best work together in a fair and representative structure that delivers results.

Emele Duituturaga (PIANGO) in Busan

After Busan, CSOs will re-convene to start a much needed reflection on this exceptional experience, and evaluate the pros and cons of this new role of being at the table while remaining activists in spirit and intent.

“Civil society came at this driven by moral and ethical motivations, but being at the table means we have had to negotiate” says Brian, who was also co-chair of the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment.

“We know we have to devise a process to move the agenda forward at the country level”.

And Emele rightfully reminds us, “after having being at the table and negotiated as equals, many of us now have to go back to our countries and face the hostile relationship with our governments”.

This blog post was written by Julia Sanchez, Canadian Council for International Co-operation.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

Aid and the Private Sector – How to make sure people and development profits

2011-11-27T07:02:00.001-05:00

“Busan is to do for the private sector what Accra did for civil society,” stated a donor, speaking at an event on the private sector in Europe.

It is perhaps no surprise that a key focus by members of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness has been to try to bring the private sector “into the tent” through the front door of the Busan Outcome Document.

Busan comes just over a year after G20 leaders put their stamp on the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth – essentially an updated version of the "Washington Consensus" with a sprinkle of equity thrown in – and a year after Seoul convened the B20, a forum of over 100 business leaders from G20 countries.

The G20 stamp is all over Busan, with a new vision for development that it is not merely “supported” but rather “driven by strong, sustainable and inclusive growth” (my emphasis - Busan Outcome Document, para 26a). Within this, it sees the private sector as the engine of that growth, “advancing innovation, creating wealth, income and jobs, mobilizing domestic resources, and in turn contributing to poverty reduction” (para 30). It leaves you wondering what states will be left to do.

For civil society, some of these issues – like the new vision for development – are deal-breakers in the current negotiations. And so it is not surprising that the role of the private sector in development has been a source of contentious and heated discussion in many of the sessions over the past few days and will continue to be so in the days to come. The Reality of Aid Network is focusing its 2012 report on “Aid and the Private Sector” and held a workshop on the issue at the Busan Civil Society Forum. The High Level Forum (HLF4) will itself host a Private Sector Forum, a side event and Thematic Session on Public Private Co-operation (TS, designed to build on the Paris Declaration (PD) and Accra Agenda for Action (AAA)), and a Building Block on the Private Sector (BBs, to build an agenda for beyond Busan).

Some of the contention around the issue could emanate from the fact that non-governmental organizations, despite strong efforts to be involved in the discussions, have been shut out from the process. In all the other BBs and TSs it has a presence. But then so have Business Associations and Trade Unions.

So why now?

In the context of declining aid budgets, more emphasis is being placed on the “value for money” of existing aid resources, and how to catalyze Official Development Assistance (ODA) to generate additional development finance resources. Increasingly the focus is falling on innovative financing mechanisms, with aid as the “capital base” to leverage additional resources from the private sector or engage them in identifying solutions to development challenges.

To complement these investments donors are organizing new facilities and departments to blend ODA with funds raised on private capital markets.

Donors are also looking to new partnerships between the private sector, governments and civil society to deliver goods and services.

And so what are the key debates and reservations among civil society on this issue? There are five.

Firstly, whose private sector benefits? Civil society is not wholly opposed to aid being used to support the private sector. Most organizations recognize the potentially positive contributions the private sector can play in development. But for most CSOs (and the occasional donor!), the prerogative of aid is to support poverty reduction and supporting the realization of the rights of the most marginalized. This means that CSOs prioritize businesses indigenous to the country, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), and social enterprises, like cooperatives as recipients of aid.

Secondly, for years the emphasis in development has been on creating an enabling environment for business. The World Bank’s (much criticized) flagship Doing Business Report ranks countries according to the ease of doing business. In practice, while it may encourage countries to streamline heavy bureaucratic processes that choke innovation, this has also led to excessive deregulation, flexibilization of work forces, and attacks on labour rights. For civil society, however, the focus is wrong. It is less a question of creating an enabling environment to develop the private sector (and stimulate investment), than creating an environment that enables the private sector (and investment) to contribute to development. This is a subtle difference, but important.

Thirdly, aid must demonstrate both financial and development additionality. CSOs are concerned that scarce ODA could be diverted from where there is a deficit - domestic public and private sector in partner countries – to where there is essentially a surplus - international corporations. This means that aid for the private sector must clearly demonstrate the following: 1) Financial additionality: Scarce public moneys must target the appropriate sectors and businesses that would otherwise not have the funds available; and 2) Development additionality: Investments of aid resources in the private sector must clearly work towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals and eradicating poverty.

Fourthly, aid to the private sector must ensure positive development outcomes. To date, most indicators for measuring the development impacts of the private sector are fairly facile. It is an issue that bilateral and multilateral donors are struggling with. Too often the number of jobs created is the proxy. What civil society is demanding is a system that both measures short term results, but that also values longer term impacts and outcomes – like decent work, job security, or equal work for equal pay. Jobs provide an income. Decent work provides a livelihood.

Finally, civil society is also demanding that the private sector must follow a set of principles that guide their practice as development actors. And by this, we don’t mean corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR can, if it is at the heart of an organization’s core business model, generate sustainable business practices; but more often than not it is just window dressing. The challenge for the private sector, as Penny Davies, the Policy Advisor at Diakonia Sweden noted in her presentation at the Reality of Aid workshop, is that when they engage in aid, they must abide by aid effectiveness principles beyond their own voluntary set of standards. Civil society has the Istanbul Principles. Why shouldn’t business have an equivalent?

Will Busan do for Business what Accra did for civil society? Yes. But unfortunately it will be “Business as usual”.

This blog post was written by Fraser Reilly-King, Canadian Council for International Co-operation, and Jeroen Kwakkenbos, European Network on Debt and Development. Both are members of the International Coordinating Committee of the Reality of Aid Network.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

“Enabling environment” – the tie that binds us

2011-11-26T13:12:00.002-05:00

If there is one issue that seems to bind civil society organizations together – that could make or break the outcome of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) – it is the issue of “enabling environment.”

The issue essentially came out of the last high level meeting, HLF3, in Accra, Ghana, in which CSOs were recognized as “independent development actors in their own right”, fulfilling a range of roles that are complementary to, but distinct from, those of government. And in order for civil society to reach their full potential, governments agreed to “work with CSOs to provide an enabling environment that maximizes their contributions to development.”

So what is an “enabling environment”? Technically speaking it is the political and policy context created by governments, official donors and other development actors that affect the ways CSOs may carry out their work. In layman’s terms, it is essentially the amount of political space and freedom that CSOs have to do what they want to do. In this sense, an “enabling environment” is an essential pre-condition for CSOs to be able to realize their full potential in society.

Since Accra, however, this space has eroded the world over. Civicus, the Act Alliance, and in Canada organizations like Voices, have all documented declining space for civil society. In almost all countries, CSOs, their staff and volunteers are experiencing political, financial and institutional vulnerability, arising from the changing policies and restrictive practices of their governments.

Civil society is not alone in their perceptions of this threat.

Speaking as the keynote on the first day of the Busan Global Civil Society Forum, Maina Kiai, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, also observed that the commitments made by governments to these rights have repeatedly been broken across the world. In addition to intimidation, governments have enacted regulatory frameworks that have inhibited CSOs’ ability to participate in the development planning as well as the disbursement of aid.

Yet for Mr. Kiai, development without rights is untenable. The Arab Spring, he said, demonstrated that growth and development can only go so far if they are not accompanied by the realization of political freedoms and rights. And CSOs have a critical role to play in this, ”building an active, engaged citizenry, which in turn helps build democracy”.

Even the Korean example, he said, demonstrated that it is impossible for a country to continue to grow without political rights.

“Progress towards the realization of economic, social and cultural rights needs high levels of accountability and transparency, underpinned by civil and political rights.”

So what is the significance of all of this for Busan?

Mr. Kiai pointed to the work of the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment (TT), a sub-group of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness that was established in 2009 to promote the implementation of civil-society related commitments in Accra.

Co-chaired by Mali, Sweden and the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (on behalf of the Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness), a key component of the task team’s work has been to gather evidence on the environments in which CSOs operate and to provide clarity on the characteristics of enabling environments.

So what then is required of governments? What are the minimum standards and fundamental rights that governments must guarantee to ensure an enabling environment for CSOs?

The Task Team is clear on this: freedom of association, freedom of expression, the right to operate free from unwarranted state interference, the right to communicate and cooperation, the right to seek and secure funding, and the state’s duty to protect.

Mr. Kiai welcomed these recommendations in his keynote address, emphasizing that these fundamental rights have already been agreed upon by governments and that, without an enabling space, CSOs cannot work as independent development actors in their own right.

So what does all of this mean for civil society, for HLF4 and for the current Busan Outcome Document?

It means everything, but it could leave us with nothing.

While Article 21 reaffirms much of what was achieved in Accra – CSOs as development actors, the complementary role they play to government in shaping development policies and plans, and the need for an enabling environment – it goes no further. There is still no clear language around enabling environment and the minimum set of standards for interpreting what this entails. The language suggested by the task team is completely absent.

As we noted at the beginning, an “enabling environment” is the essential pre-condition for Civil society to be able to realize their full potential. Recognizing the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness in the Outcome Document are important developments. But with no minimum guarantees that give civil society the space to implement the Principles, the recognition is meaningless.

On November 28th, during the final negotiation of the Outcome Document, BetterAid will continue to try to push these standards into the text. Europe, the UK and Canada have all indicated their support for greater clarity in terms of what constitutes an enabling environment, but it is unclear the extent to which they are supportive of a minimum set of standards.

Who knows what will happen? But what is certain is that “enabling environment” is the glue that holds civil society together. It allows us to realize our full potential in society. And without that glue, and without some clear standards on what that means, civil society will still hold together, but it could be our support for the outcome document that falls apart.

This blog post was written by Brian Tomlinson, AidWatch Canada and Co-Chair of the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment, Shannon Kindornay, The North-South Institute, Fraser Reilly-King, Canadian Council for International Co-operation.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

Will Korea’s ambition rub off on the outcomes of HLF-4?

2011-11-25T09:21:00.002-05:00

The city of Busan, Korea’s second largest city, brings the metaphor of the “East Asian Tiger” to life.

Upon arriving at the airport, travelers are greeted by the words “Korea – Beyond expectation.” From high above the city of Busan, the view reveals an incredible contrast between the highly developed business areas and their 100 story skyscrapers - true modern architectural pieces of art – that carve their way through rolling green hills and mountains, barely contained by the Pacific Ocean. Korea’s transformation over the past 50 years is a testament to the ambition that Seoul has for the global stage.

In 1950, during the Korean War, tens of thousands of Koreans fled to Busan, on the South Eastern coast, looking for safe refuge, and finding it in a huge camp city that dominated the Busan landscape until 1953. The war left Korea devastated – destroying two-thirds of the countries production facilities, and leaving high unemployment across the country. During the reconstruction period from 1953-1960, over 70 percent of Korea’s imports were financed by foreign aid. Fifty years later, and Korea had become a provider of official development assistance, giving in 2007 USD$680 million in aid (about one-eight of current Canadian ODA).

Indeed, ambitious seems like an apt description for today’s Korea, actively positioning itself as a leader on the global stage. In a period of three years, it will have played host to the G20 meeting in Seoul in 2010, the High Level Forum in 2011 in Busan, and the World Expo 2012 in Yeosu.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) from around the world have brought their own ambitions to Busan. Starting tomorrow (Saturday) through to Monday, upwards of 800 CSO representatives will gather at the Busan Civil Society Forum (BCSF), an event that originally expected some 500 participants. CSOs will finalize preparation of key messages for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4), which starts on November 29 and runs through to December 1. The BCSF will ensure a high degree of coordination and organization at HLF4, at an event that will attract 2000 participants, including more than 100 Ministers and 40 heads of international organizations. Indeed, the Civil Society Forum promises to ensure that the 300 civil society participants in HLF4 will be one of the most organized groups heading into the final round of negotiations on the fifth version Busan Outcome Document (BOD).

A CSO team has been working intensely in the past couple of weeks to support Tony Tujan, Chairperson of BetterAid, a platform of more than 900 organizations, and the CSO “Sherpa” at the negotiating table. Ever since the Third High Level Forum in Accra, where civil society were recognized as “independent development actors in their own right”, BetterAid has been an official member of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-Eff) – the entity that is driving this process.

The fifth version of the BOD was completed a few days ago. On November 28^th a final round of pre-HLF4 negotiations will take place, resulting in the final version of the BOD that will go to the Ministers for consideration during HLF4. They could accept it as is. Or open up negotiations again.

So how have the negotiations gone so far? The fifth version realizes some clear CSO ambitions for the outcomes from HLF4. To mention just a few, BOD5 includes a set of fairly progressive “shared principles for common goals” that provide the guidelines for all development actors present in Busan – non-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, DAC donors, partner governments and CSOs. In terms of specifics, for example, the second principle, “focus on results,” states that efforts “must have a lasting impact on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality, on sustainable development, and on enhancing developing countries’ capacities.” Here, there is implicit recognition that results are about development outcomes. And transparency has been added to the fourth principle on accountability. The shared principle is now “transparency and accountability to each other,” and it recognizes that transparency forms the basis of enhanced accountability. Reference to the International Aid Transparency Initiative, which had been hotly contested by some donors, seems to have survived the final round of pre-HLF4 negotiations.

There have also been important additions to the key paragraph for civil society, paragraph 21. It now recognizes that CSOs “play a vital role in enabling people to claim their rights.” This recognition implies a rights-based approach for CSOs – even if human rights can barely be found anywhere else in the document. This paragraph also reinforces the commitment of CSOs to improve their accountability and development practices, and acknowledges both the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness.

Despite these gains, clarity around what is meant by a “CSO enabling environment” is still absent. In particular, CSOs have argued that human rights, such as freedom of assembly and freedom of speech, provide the necessary foundation for an enabling environment. Although CSOs proposed specific text to this end for the BOD, some governments involved in the negotiation processes have been unwilling to include it. (Canada has been (surprisingly) supportive.)

Finally, the life of the WP-Eff – which was supposed to end in Busan – has been extended until June 2012, to help guide the development of indicators and a monitoring framework for Busan, and to steer the development of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation. And civil society will, presumably, still have a seat in that process.

Many are hoping for an ambitious outcome from Busan that receives strong political endorsement by Ministers who arrive in town in four days. While this sentiment has characterized the negotiations thus far, it is unclear whether the ambition of the document will resonate with the 100 plus Ministers that are expected. Each may be keen to put their own political stamp on an outcome that will shape the face of aid for at least the next five years.

“Beyond expectation” ? You can’t but hope that some of the drive and ambition Korea has shown in the past 50 years might rub off on the coming week’s events, and help create a new, inclusive, and legitimate Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation.

This blog was written by Shannon Kindornay, The North-South Institute, Brian Tomlinson, AidWatch Canada, and Fraser Reilly-King, Canadian Council for International Co-operation.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

Busan: A defining moment for development: Where will CIDA stand?

2011-11-23T10:31:00.001-05:00

(an edited version of this Op Ed is published today in Embassy)

Next week, two heads of state, ministers from over 100 countries, the leaders of more than 40 international organizations, and over 2000 individuals will gather in Busan, South Korea, for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4).

With the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness having effectively expired in 2010, Busan represents a key moment for donors and partner governments to reaffirm and implement existing commitments, and to work with a whole new set of development actors to define a forward looking agenda and framework for aid and international co-operation.

The outcomes of Busan also represent a defining moment for CIDA, in terms of the priorities it sets for itself post-Busan and for Canadian international cooperation over the next five years.

What should some of those priorities be? There are several, but three that could find some traction with the Canadian government in the coming years.

Firstly, transparency of aid allocation, but also aid execution, and its impact for poor and vulnerable populations.

Over the past year, CIDA has taken some important steps forward in terms of its own transparency. In June, it launched a new open data portal for all its projects and programs, with additional content expected in the coming months. In September, Canada also signed on to the Open Government Partnership, a multinational initiative that promotes more open, accountable, effective and transparent governance.

In Busan, the government could go one step further by setting out a timetable for committing to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), where currently 19 donors, multilateral organizations and several NGOs have signed up to a set of common standards on publishing aid information. CIDA’s current open data portal could easily be made compatible with phase one of IATI. The apparent hesitation by CIDA to sign on to phase two (and IATI itself) lies in the implications for substantial translation that would come with committing to a more comprehensive degree of disclosure in phase two. All donors recognize the need for time to meet technical and legal requirements. What we are suggesting is a commitment in a reasonable timeframe to provide Canadians with the information they need to assess the substance of Canada’s aid programs and policies, beyond basic data on projects. Signing on to IATI could bring CIDA kudos from other donors, while allowing the Agency to spread out the commitment over a manageable timeframe.

But that is not the full story on transparency. Governments and citizens in partner countries also want to know how CIDA’s money is being spent. To help achieve this, CIDA should implement the commitment it made in Accra in 2008 at the last High Level Forum and lay out rolling three to five year country allocations for its aid. This would provide some degree of predictability to southern governments who must plan their own budget priorities. Forward aid allocation targets by all donors will not only assist governments in their planning, but will also enable parliaments and citizens to debate priorities for their domestic budgets. In this regard, CIDA should also support the capacities of parliamentarians, civil society, and the media to monitor and interpret donor and budget information for their citizens.

Secondly, balancing results with outcomes.

In an age of budget cuts, and flat-lined or declining aid budgets, parliamentarians are demanding that every penny a donor spends be linked to tangible results and demonstrate “value for money”. The public, we are told, wants results. Of course they do. But they also want to see sustained reductions in poverty and inequality. They want to know that kids have a school to go to, but they also support universal primary education as a right, not a privilege. And while it is easy to measure the number of students going to school, it is much more difficult to address the quality of the education provided and its real impact on the life chances of these children. Canadians also want to see women get access to credit so that they can start up their own business, or have the right to own property, but they also realize that equality between men and women does not happen in a matter of weeks or even years.

Short term results are important indicators of progress, but more important are sustained outcomes that guarantee those results over the long term for poor and vulnerable people. The challenge of measuring longer-term less tangible outcomes – like strengthening citizens’ capacities to monitor government delivery of health services – has always been the rationale for focusing more on short-term results, like the number of children vaccinated. But CIDA doesn’t have to choose one or the other. It can balance tangible results that are important for the Agency and for Canadians, with support for less measureable outcomes that are important to, and defined by, the constituencies with which it is working – partner governments, civil society North and South, and beneficiaries. Given the chance, Canada’s aid partners will likely be quite innovative in articulating the “results” they want and how to go about measuring them.

Finally, a new partnership with civil society.

Three years ago civil society organizations (CSOs), responsible for more than $25 billion in development resources, were challenged in the last High Level Forum to improve their effectiveness and be more accountable. Since 2008, a CSO-led global Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness held more than seventy national consultations with 3500 organizations. In September 2010 they agreed on a set of Principles to guide civil society in their contribution to development as independent development actors, complementary but distinct from the actions of governments and donors. The Istanbul Principles, and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness, are two key inputs for the High Level Forum. Their inclusion in the outcome document is an important nod to the key role civil society plays in development, and the principles it has proposed to define its work.

CIDA played a hugely important role prior to the Accra High Level Forum in laying the ground work for this recognition of civil society as development actors. Post Busan, CIDA could develop a strategy which comprehensively addresses how it will work with civil society in the context of the Istanbul Principles. Such a strategy could accommodate the Agency’s ambitions for being more effective, and the place for civil society within this strategy. But it must also recognize and support the diversity of roles -- in policy dialogue, in learning and knowledge development, in public engagement and education, and as agents of change – outside of their traditional roles in humanitarian relief or service delivery to poor populations.

The enabling environment for civil society, particularly in holding governments to account or empowering marginalized populations, has been under attack in many countries since the last High Level Forum in 2008. Canada, along with other like-minded donors, government officials and civil society, must take the initiative in Busan to agree that basic human rights standards are essential if civil society is to effectively contribute to development.

Busan is a defining moment for aid and international cooperation. We hope that CIDA’s response will be a defining moment for Canadian development cooperation.

Julia Sanchez is the President-CEO of the Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC). CCIC is a Member of the Coordinating Group of BetterAid, which represents civil society on the Sherpa team negotiating the final draft Outcome Document for Busan. She will be in Busan.

BetterAid campaign postcards

On the road to Busan

2011-11-17T14:34:00.002-05:00

From November 29 to December 1, 2011, two Prime Ministers, over 100 Ministers, 50 parliamentarians and 40 heads of international organizations, including the UN Secretary General, will meet in Busan, South Korea, at the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4). With the Paris Declaration having technically expired in 2010, Busan “must deliver the foundations for an ambitious, inclusive partnership in support of effective co-operation and collaborative action to advance progress on the Millennium Development Goals by 2015”. The ambition for Busan is to create a short, high-level political and actionable statement. But political commitments must be backed up with some firm indicators, time bound commitments and a monitorable framework if these commitments are to be meaningful and generate the necessary political will to carry them forward.

The Busan process is unique as a multilateral process in that multiple stakeholders, including civil society through the BetterAid Coordinating Group, are directly involved in the preparations for Busan and in the negotiations to shape the final Outcome Document.

From November 23 until December 3, a number of Canadians from different civil society organizations will be in Busan engaging in the process: Robert Fox from Oxfam Canada; Joseph Ingram and Shannon Kindornay from The North-South Institute; Gervais L’Heureux from l’Association québécoise des organismes de coopération international; Fraser Reilly-King and Julia Sanchez from the Canadian Council for International Co-operation; and Brian Tomlinson from AidWatch Canada.

Over seven days, they will be providing reflections directly from Busan on a range of topics among them global inequality, the private sector and aid, gender equality and development, the enabling environment, continuing the global CSO engagement around aid, and the future of aid architecture.

This blog post was written by Fraser Reilly-King, Canadian Council for International Co-operation.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.