Le défi mondial d’éliminer la pauvreté et l’injustice : seule l’action collective peut transformer nos vœux en réalité (première partie)*

En 2008, le Conseil canadien pour la coopération internationale et ses membres adoptaient un programme en 10 points visant à s’attaquer aux causes profondes de la pauvreté et de l’injustice dans le monde. Ce programme présentait une vision de la société civile canadienne quant à la façon dont le Canada peut jouer un rôle décisif pour aider à mettre un terme à la pauvreté et à l’injustice.

Trois ans plus tard ce plan d’action demeure, plus que jamais, d’actualité. A la fin d’une année mouvementée pour les organisations internationales et nationales impliquées dans le développement  international, je vous en présente les grandes lignes, comme un appel renouvelé à serrer les rangs et à redoubler d’ardeur pour que les priorités de ce plan deviennent réalité.

1)      Promouvoir  les droits des femmes et l’égalité des sexes

Toutes les statistiques le confirment : à l’échelle planétaire, les femmes sont beaucoup plus touchées par la pauvreté, l’exclusion et l’analphabétisme. Les femmes n’ont pas les mêmes possibilités que les hommes de façonner le développement social, politique et économique et d’y participer.

Le Canada a réduit radicalement le financement versé au mouvement des femmes ainsi qu’à la recherche et au plaidoyer. La situation est semblable dans le reste du monde. Nous devons renverser la tendance si nous tenons vraiment à instaurer l’égalité entre les sexes. Les mesures du Canada doivent comprendre un soutien considérable aux organisations de défense des droits de femmes, ainsi qu’une attention explicite aux inégalités entre les sexes dans l’ensemble des initiatives internationales en matière de diplomatie, d’aide, de commerce et de défense.

2)      Promouvoir  la santé et l’éducation pour tous

Toutes les personnes ont le droit à l’éducation et à la meilleure santé physique et mentale possible. La santé et l’instruction sont des préalables nécessaires à l’élimination de la pauvreté et à l’exercice de tous les autres droits.

Les experts reconnaissent que la santé, la pauvreté et l’éducation sont inextricablement liés. La dégradation de l’environnement et la pollution ont également un impact négatif sur la santé.

La population canadienne a accès à des services de santé et d’éducation universels, financés par l’État, et les apprécie (bien que des remises en question inquiétantes aient cours récemment) . Nos politiques d’aide internationale doivent appuyer l’accès à de tels services de qualité dans les pays en développement. Le Canada doit aussi agir comme chef de file pour exclure des accords commerciaux les services sociaux tels que la santé, l’éducation et l’eau potable.

3)      Promouvoir le droit à l’alimentation et assurer des moyens de subsistance viables aux producteurs d’aliments dans les pays en développement

Une alimentation convenable pour tous constitue un droit des plus fondamentaux. Or, les aliments sont devenus une simple marchandise régie par les lois du marché. La moitié des personnes les plus affamées au monde sont en fait des producteurs agricoles, surtout des femmes.

La géographie de la faim est le reflet de l’iniquité des règles commerciales et d’une industrialisation mondiale de l’agriculture qui prive les petits exploitants agricoles de leurs droits.

Le Canada devrait plaider en faveur de règles commerciales plus équitables qui mettent un terme aux subventions injustes, préservent les marchés locaux, et ouvrent les marchés du Nord aux producteurs du Sud. Notre aide devrait privilégier des initiatives fondées sur les connaissances et les méthodes écologiques des agriculteurs locaux, plutôt que des solutions techniques venues d’ailleurs.

4)      Bâtir un monde de justice économique

Chaque année, des centaines de milliards de dollars affluent des pays pauvres vers les pays riches sous forme de remboursement de la dette et de bénéfices pour le secteur privé ainsi que par l’entremise du commerce inéquitable et de la fuite de capitaux. Ces sommes sont de loin supérieures à celles de l’aide internationale octroyée aux pauvres.

Au nord comme au sud, de plus en plus d’acteurs de la société civile s’opposent à une mondialisation économique qui favorise les riches (comme nous l’avons vu cette année notamment avec le mouvement des indignés). Ils plaident en faveur d’une approche de l’économie mondiale fondée sur la justice, qui accorde la priorité aux droits de la personne, et à la réforme des institutions financières internationales.

Il faut revoir en profondeur le système financier international et mettre en œuvre de nouveaux moyens pour financer le développement : taxation et redistribution de la richesse, optimisation des bénéfices publics tirés de l’investissement étranger, lutte contre la corruption, etc.

5)      Assurer la responsabilisation des entreprises

La première obligation de l’État, soit de faire respecter les droits fondamentaux de ses citoyens, cède maintenant souvent le pas à ses intérêts de défendre les droits des entreprises.

Les populations sont de plus en plus conscientes du fait que les sociétés du Nord ne respectent pas les mêmes normes à l’étranger que dans leur propre pays : les exemples de compagnies canadiennes implantées dans des pays en développement et aux pratiques environnementales et sociales douteuses se sont multipliées ces dernières années. L’adhésion des entreprises à des codes de bonne conduite volontaires n’a pas donné de résultats probants.

La société civile réclame que la responsabilité des entreprises soit obligatoire et réglementée, tant à l’échelle nationale qu’internationale, conformément aux normes internationales en matière de droits de la personne et de l’environnement.

(* ce texte s’inspire largement du document « Le défi mondial d’éliminer la pauvreté et l’injustice : un programme canadien en 10 points ». La 2^e partie du texte sera publiée la première semaine de janvier 2012)

Chantal Havard est agente de communication et de relations avec le gouvernement au CCCI.

Towards a New and Improved Americas Strategy for Canada?

In July 2007, the Prime Minister launched Canada’s “Re-engagement in the Americas” strategy. At the time, no policy document on the Americas Strategy was made available, nor were there any substantive opportunities for civil society engagement and comment. CCIC’s Americas Policy Group (APG) was left to piece together this elusive “Americas Strategy” by reviewing speeches, statements, political appointments and visits in the region.

Four years later, in October 2011, DFAIT decided to “review and renew” the Americas Strategy and approached the APG for input. DFAIT recognized that the original Americas Strategy had been somewhat haphazard and designed without sufficient input from civil society organizations. We were assured that the process would be different this time and were invited to participate in a series of consultations on Canada’s engagement in the Americas.

We were not sure whether to be pleased or skeptical. Would our participation help give credibility to their consultation process and imply that that we endorsed the final product – even if it didn’t reflect our views? Was this a worthwhile use of our sector’s already over-stretched time?

Despite these doubts, it seemed contradictory to turn down the opportunity after having criticized the government for its failure to consult civil society the first time around. We therefore agreed to participate in the process and to wait before making any definitive statements on its merits or demerits.

The consultations held thus far have been encouraging at times and discouraging at others. We are receiving signals that the government’s priorities in the Americas differ from our own. In a consultation on October 31st, Allan Culham (DFAIT’s DG of Hemispheric Affairs and Permanent Representative to the OAS) rejoiced at the free trade agreement with Colombia, pointed to Canada and Colombia’s robust trade numbers, and failed to mention human rights at all until prompted. The APG would have preferred to see him adopt a more nuanced approach to the trade deal, one that acknowledged the potential for Colombian lives and livelihoods to be affected by the scramble for metals and land, and one that took seriously the annual Human Rights Impact Assessment that both governments have agreed to conduct.

The consultation was nonetheless encouraging to the extent that many civil society organizations spoke up and voiced concerns similar to our own. Representatives from numerous Canadian civil society organizations called on the government to pay more attention to marginalized groups, to consider the root causes of organized crime and to improve Canadian extractive companies’ human rights and environmental record in the Americas.

A December 6th dialogue with Diane Ablonczy (Minister of State of Foreign Affairs, Americas & Consular Affairs) signaled, once again, that the government’s priorities in the Americas differ from our own. The panelists (12 men and 1 woman) were mainly business-oriented, and there was more discussion of how to compete with China for investments in the Americas than talk of human rights or equitable development. An Export Development Canada panelist stated that they key to Canada’s success in the region was its ability to “import labour without moving it” – in other words, to make full use of the cheap labour available in Latin America. The APG would have liked to hear a more nuanced statement: one that was accompanied by a recognition that the pursuit of cheap labour at all costs can be a slippery slope, especially in contexts where the right to unionize is severely constricted.

DFAIT has also asked for written input on Canada’s engagement with the Americas, and the APG has agreed to submit its recommendations. We will continue to promote an Americas Strategy that is based on respect for the full spectrum of human rights for all citizens of the hemisphere - an Americas Strategy that leaves no one behind. The civil society voices we heard at the October 31st consultation with Allan Culham suggest that others want the same thing. We hope that our participation in this process will encourage the government to think about these issues and include them in its Strategy. If the government is serious about putting together a new, improved and inclusive strategy for the Americas, it should.


This blog post was written by Brittany Lambert, coordinator of CCIC's Americas Policy Group (APG).

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC, APG or its members.

Gauging the temperature of the new Global Partnership: Take Two

It was a relief to finally walk along the beach this morning, and feel the sand give way beneath my feet – something real after eight consecutive days of heady discussions and negotiations with government officials and among ourselves. 


Looking back on the city from a vantage point on the rocks, you could see storm clouds in the distance retreating behind Busan’s rolling hills and its metallic-coloured skyscrapers, tall fingers of glass trying to poke a hole in the sky. In the distance, out on the edge of the sea, soft misty clouds blur the horizon. 


A day earlier, Angel Gurria, the Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Brian Atwood, the Chair of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, and Talaat Abdel-Malek, the Chair of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), were all patting themselves on the back for a “job well done”. 


The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation is indeed in many ways a landmark accomplishment. It has extended the tent to a broader range of development actors – including emerging economies, the private sector, and civil society – and framed an agenda for aid and development effectiveness going forward. Furthermore, Mexico, Brazil and South Africa genuinely seem committed to the full partnership, having committed themselves to it before China rejoined the negotiations, but downgraded its own status within the framework and the principles of “South-South cooperation” to a purely “voluntary” arrangement. 


This is unfortunate as it means a slow boat for China to real aid and development effectiveness. But then it was always the prerogative of the OECD and many of the donors to get China in the tent, and at any price. They paid it, it would seem. 


On the flip side, if China even shows a little more commitment to Busan than the traditional donors have shown to Paris and Accra, they will already be ahead of the game. 


Busan also established an important set of principles for all development actors that are “consistent with our agreed international commitments on human rights, decent work, gender equality, environmental sustainability and disability,” and move beyond Paris in important ways. Ownership has a more democratic orientation, refocusing on countries instead of just states – and sets out a more inclusive role for all development actors, including parliaments, local governments and CSOs in shaping development policy. And while the Busan Partnership may still focus on “results”, again its orientation is longer term, looking at outcomes that have “a lasting impact on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality.” Transparency and accountability also goes beyond an inter donor-government relationship, to accountability to intended beneficiaries and respective citizens. 


In terms of specifics, the use of country systems is now the default option, the International Aid Transparency Initiative got a big boost of support, and gender equality and women’s empowerment made some important advances. Most importantly for civil society, the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness, and the rights-based approaches of civil society to development, found international recognition – even from US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, during the official opening. The enabling environment now has some link to “agreed international rights”, although how this new language will curb the current sway towards a disabling environment in many country contexts is unclear. Finally by extending the life of the WP-EFF until June, CSOs have an opportunity to shape the future aid architecture, and the all important indicators and monitoring framework for Busan. 


A number of other issues – like tied aid and aid predictability – stayed the course. 


 Where Busan fell short was on acknowledging the lack of implementation of Paris and Accra and the all essential follow-up to Busan, the vision for the private sector, fragile states and the gender action plan. As noted elsewhere on this blog, one of the key elements of the Paris Declaration was the inclusion of a set of indicators and a monitoring framework for tracking progress on implementation. This has illustrated how donors have largely failed to realize their commitments to Paris. And this has caused some scepticism about their ability to live up to Busan’s commitments, underscoring the importance of defining indicators and a monitoring framework for the Partnership, a decision deferred until June 2012. 


 Similarly, CSOs feel that donors need to focus on this “unfinished business” before they turn their attention to “big business”. A year after Seoul’s Development Consensus for Shared Growth, Busan not surprisingly places economic growth and the private sector at the heart of development, instead of the other way around. And while the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” has won broad support among more than 40 governments, fragile states are essentially getting a “raw deal”, with peace-building a wholly state-centric, rather than people-centred, process. Without a clear indicators and a monitoring framework, implementation will be a challenge. 


But beyond the specific text, civil society has its own accomplishments of which to be proud. 


At the opening of the Busan Global Civil Society Forum, Tony Tujan, the Chair of BetterAid and the CSO Sherpa at the negotiations, acknowledged that we of course want something from the Partnership that fulfils our demands. But beyond that, “whatever comes out of Busan, we want it to recognize our role as independent development actors that belong in an inclusive global partnership for development.” 


For the past three years, we have been fighting to have a seat at the table and keep that seat. We have not been given much space, but in that space, and throughout the fierce negotiations, our critical but constructive statements, and our thoughtful interventions, we have gone one step further. We will still have to fight for that seat, but now at least many more governments hopefully recognize why we deserve a seat at the table. 


“CSOs are a vibrant and essential feature in the democratic life of countries across the globe playing a vital role in advancing development effectiveness in order to achieve human rights, gender equality, social justice, decent work, environmental sustainability, peace and an end to corruption and impunity within a solid framework of democratic governance, rights-based approaches, and inclusive policy engagement,” said Emele Duituturaga, Co-Chair of the Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness, in her speech at the closing plenary. 


“We have truly valued our inclusion as equals at the HLF4 negotiating table and expect this practice to be replicated at national levels.” 


It is a goal worth shooting for. 


My thoughts come back to the beach in Busan, and somebody tells me it is snowing back in Ottawa. I hope the ground hasn’t frozen over yet. 


This blog post was written by Fraser Reilly-King, Canadian Council for International Co-operation.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

A happy ending in Busan? Take One

In contrast to the rather mild weather that characterized the first two days of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4), the final day was met with a cold, rainy morning – gloomy to be sure, pathetic fallacy maybe. After all, the final day held the promise of a new Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and participants descended on Bexco – the HLF4 venue – eager to see how the final act would play out in Busan.

And how did it all end? Was HLF4 a comedy? A tragedy? Well, perhaps that depends on your perspective. Participants spent the final day discussing the post-Busan agenda and topped it off with a closing ceremony where – with much fanfare and self-congratulation – delegates highlighted important gains and how they will take the outcome document forward.

And what are the important gains? Here’s my take:

Transparency: the Busan Outcome Document (BOD) makes transparency and accountability one of the shared principles for all development partners. Participants agreed to implement “a common, open standard for electronic publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on resources provided through development co-operation [...] with the aim of implementing it fully by December 2015.” In addition, countries like the United States and Canada, as well as donors such as the Inter-American Development Bank and International Fund for Agricultural Development have signed on to the International Aid Transparency Initiative, which aims to make information about aid spending easier to find, use and compare.

New Deal for Fragile States: a “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” was struck in Busan committing parties that endorsed to “support inclusive country led and country owned transitions out of fragility based on a country-led fragility assessment developed by the g7+ [group of fragile and conflict affected states] with the support of international partners, a country-led one vision and one plan, a country compact to implement the plan, using the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) to monitor progress, and support inclusive and participatory political dialogue.” This New Deal was welcomed in the BOD.

Enabling Environment for Civil Society: While civil society would have liked to see more gains in the BOD on, for example, broad commitment to the rights-based approach and more recognition on the lack of progress against Paris and Accra, CSOs successfully negotiated the inclusion of reference to international rights in relation to commitments on an enabling environment – a key ask for civil society. The final BOD reads that governments will “implement fully respective commitments to enable CSOs to exercise their roles as independent development actors, with a particular focus on an enabling environment, consistent with agreed international rights, that maximises the contributions of CSOs to development.”

Of course, there are also areas of mixed success.

Enlarging the tent: A goal for HLF4 was to develop a Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Organizers wanted to broaden the number of actors engaged in aid effectiveness discussions, bringing Southern providers of development assistance and private sector actors into the fold. Countries like China, India and Brazil have endorsed the shared principles in the BOD, effectively enlarging the tent from what was historically a traditional donor driven agenda. However, this victory is bittersweet as these countries have not signed on to any specific commitments. Nevertheless, this success has prompted the Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, Brian Atwood to shout from the rooftops that the OECD is no longer a “rich men’s club.” He later suggested that future meetings of the Global Partnership – which is to be an inclusive, representative body that oversees the commitments made in Busan at the global level – could be held in conjunction with OECD DAC High Level Ministerial Meetings. The irony of this suggestion, following on the heels of his earlier statement, was not lost on this blogger.

Beyond Aid: The BOD broadened the aid effectiveness agenda to development cooperation. While it references the role of the private sector, south-south cooperation and triangular cooperation, combating corruption and illicit flows, and climate change finance, it does not spell out a broad agenda for better policy coherence for development. In other words, it does not challenge the systemic problems facing developing countries, such as, for example, unfair trade policies on agriculture subsidies and non-tariff barriers, or work to better facilitate the transfer of remittances from developed countries to the developing world – key challenges facing developing countries whose solution would greatly benefit development efforts. But then again, maybe movement on these issues is too much to expect from a High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. Nevertheless, the agenda has broadened, and this should be welcomed. Perhaps it represents the first step towards putting these systemic issues on the table.

So how will these gains be taken forward?

The outcome document essentially discusses the post-Busan agenda in two ways, first in terms of how commitments will be monitored and evaluated, and secondly, in terms of the institutional makeup that will oversee these processes. At this point, participants have essentially agreed to agree later on both fronts, and there seems to be little urgency in terms of taking these important commitments forward. Nevertheless the outcome document provides some general guidance in both areas.

Participants in Busan have extended a lifeline to the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), which has historically overseen the high level process and monitoring of commitments, and whose mandate was supposed to be up in Busan. On the issue of indicators, by June 2012, the WP-EFF will decide on how commitments are monitored and evaluated at the global level. Monitoring and evaluation at the country level will be decided through nationally-led multi-stakeholder processes. Indeed, the mantra of the post-Busan agenda has become “global light, country heavy.” Participants have agreed to develop a selective and relevant set of indicators and targets to monitor progress at the global level – the bulk of their focus however, will be at the country level.

And who will oversee the monitoring and evaluation process?

The BOD commits participants to a “new, inclusive and representative Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation to support and ensure accountability for the implementation of commitments at the political level.” The sentiment in Busan is that the lack of progress on Paris and Accra is a result of little political support for the aid effectiveness agenda, as highlighted in CCIC’s blog on Day 1 of HLF4. In response, the BOD suggests that the Global Partnership will be characterized by regular ministerial-level engagement – this is a bid to develop and maintain political support for the BOD and its implementation. These meetings would be held in conjunction with other fora.

The outcome document also invites the UN Development Cooperation Forum – a multi-stakeholder forum within the UN that dialogues on issue relating to development cooperation – to play a role. It also refers to the OECD and the UNDP, which may play an important role in monitoring global and national commitments.

So, is Busan a comedy, tragedy or something else? Only time will tell, as the answer to this question is – like its predecessors in Paris and Accra – all in the implementation.

This blog post was written by Shannon Kindornay, The North-South Institute, and delegate to the Fourth High Level Forum.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

Getting the Busan Gender Plan back on the rights track

What was to be a showcase announcement on gender equality at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness landed with a bit of a thud as women’s organizations from around the world gave the plan a cold shoulder.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton teamed up with the Korean government and several other countries – Canada included – to launch the Busan Joint Action Plan on Gender Equality and Development Wednesday. The keystone of the plan is EDGE which stands for Evidence and Data on Gender Equality – a much needed and welcome investment in the capacity of governments and institutions to collect and analyze data broken down by gender. This information is critical to good public policy, providing decision-makers with evidence and insights on how their actions or inaction are affecting women and girls differently than men and boys.

Nothing offensive about that. Indeed the only critique is how modest an initiative it is.

The target of the women’s movements’ scorn is the other element of the Busan plan, aimed at boosting support to women entrepreneurs. And here the concerns have more layers than an onion, each with the capacity to leave you in tears. On the surface is the focus on women as engines of economic growth. Everyone it seems is hot on women these days – the UN, the development banks, the aid agencies, the private sector. There’s not much money flowing their way but there’s lots of talk about women as a great untapped resource that, with more support, could spur tremendous growth within flagging economies.

There’s truth to that but cause for caution too. Women have every reason to be suspicious of yet another scheme that instrumentalizes women and girls for a broader objective rather than putting women’s rights at its centre.

Most development projects just ignore women. But too many create more work for women without creating more power, rights or respect for women.

Delegates to the Women’s Forum of the Busan Global Civil Society Forum recounted examples where micro-credit, community loans and other schemes simply added to the burden of women whose plates were full but were going hungry. Between their underpaid and unpaid work women already put in two-thirds of all the hours worked on the planet. Yet many are so desperate they jump at the chance to further indebt themselves, taking out micro-loans to start a business – in effect, a third or fourth job – even though too many of them have little control over the income they earn.

Lenders gladly loan them money – as long as the amount is small enough – confident the women will repay their debts. Socialization and community pressure mean default rates are very low, even when the cost to the women is very high.

Forum delegates note the dominant economic model is founded on women’s unpaid and underpaid work. The burgeoning care economy and the growth of precarious work that relies on a constantly replenished pool of young women workers were cited as examples of the sorts of entrepreneurship that was as likely to enslave as to empower women.

That women want more economic opportunity and freedom there is no doubt. That they want recognition for their many contributions to economic growth and legal status as owners of lands, homes and assets, of course. That they want decent work and opportunities to open and grow businesses, again, that’s true. But the women state unequivocally that the foundation for prosperity with equity is rights.

They believe it is naïve or disingenuous to promote the three E’s – education, employment and entrepreneurship – as the recipe to end inequality without tackling the attitudes and behaviours, customs and norms that perpetuate patriarchy. They underline too the need to address violence and child care and climate change and a wide range of issues that create vulnerability and inequality and represent systemic barriers to eradicating poverty. And they call for an initiative that is grounded in rights, that starts with the Beijing agenda and that engages women’s organizations from the outset in the conception and design of the proposal as well as its delivery and assessment. Is the Busan Joint Action Plan dead? No, not yet. While early reviews were negative, no doubt some women’s groups will test USAID’s expressed openness to dialogue. And were the engagement genuine and the resulting plan rights-based, comprehensive and ambitious, there could yet be enthusiasm for this venture. [And were the US to ratify CEDAW, Secretary Clinton would have more credibility as its champion.]

As for Canada, it will be important that CIDA take an active role in the reframing of this initiative. Sustainable economic growth has been identified as a priority by the government. While the details of the strategy remain under wraps, we can only hope that women’s economic empowerment is central. And if so, a new, improved Busan plan might be the perfect means to leverage Canada’s investment to have the kind of results that all women will welcome.

This blog post was written by Robert Fox, Executive Director of Oxfam Canada and delegate to the High Level Forum.

 The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

Progress since Paris? Clearly not enough

At last the countdown to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) is over. Governments and the sherpas are finalizing the draft Outcome Document, and civil society, represented in greater numbers than ever before, have completed their “Statement” on the draft Document. The stage is set for tomorrow’s formal opening.

As HLF4 gets underway, several donors, Canada included, have signed on to the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) just in time for some media friendly back-slapping and hand shaking. While the addition of new donors to IATI – which aims to make information about aid spending easier to find, use and compare – is welcome (and Canadian CSOs have certainly applauded Canada’s efforts), participants have been less optimistic about post-Busan as they look back on progress since Paris and Accra, the focus of Day 1.

And what kind of progress has there been? Well - not much. Indeed, with the release of the 2011 Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration, the Independent Evaluation of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration and The Reality of Aid Special Report on civil society perspectives on progress since Paris in the lead up to HLF4, participants meeting in Busan are quite aware that with a few exceptions, the Paris Process has failed to deliver on its promise of better aid. All three evaluations of the Paris process have shown that, although the aid effectiveness agenda has had some impact on the way aid is delivered, there has been a lack of political will to ensure the full implementation of the Paris Principles and the Accra Agenda for Action.

The 2011 Monitoring Survey demonstrated sobering results. At the global level, only one of the 13 targets established for 2010 to measure the implementation of aid effectiveness commitments has been met, and just barely. Progress has varied across donors, and in some areas, such as reducing aid fragmentation and proliferation, there has been a backsliding. Indeed, Brian Atwood, Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (read, “important person at HLF4”), actually stated that given the lack of progress on reducing aid fragmentation and proliferation - a donor commitment - we should be careful about how optimistic we are with respect to future improvements (a statement which he later retracted - apparently the optics are bad when the Chair of the OECD-DAC says there is little hope).

Indeed, the monitoring survey highlighted little or no progress on aid predictability and the implementation of donor commitments to common arrangements and procedures. Developing countries, on the other hand, have fared better, meeting many of their commitments, such as putting in place sound national development strategies and in some cases national results frameworks.

The Independent Evaluation of the Paris Declaration also found that donors were slower to implement their commitments than developing countries, despite the fact that the expected changes for them were more demanding. According to the report, “donors and agencies have so far demonstrated less commitment than partner countries to making the necessary changes in their own systems.” Nevertheless, the report found that the aid effectiveness process was important in generating norms of good practice, improving the quality of a number of aid partnerships, and relevant to improving aid processes, at least in theory.

While these evaluations were important to monitoring the implementation of Paris commitments, civil society identified a significant gap in the instruments, namely a failure to adequately measure the impact of the aid effectiveness agenda on democratic ownership and development effectiveness.

As a result, the Reality of Aid network (RoA) produced a Special Report looking at progress on the following: creating multi-stakeholder bodies and effective consultative processes to prioritize and monitor development policies; developing an enabling environment for civil society; producing transparency and access to information so as to inform accountability; and formulating poverty indicators that suggest outcomes for poor and vulnerable people.

Like the Monitoring Survey and the Independent Evaluation, RoA found that the aid effectiveness agenda has produced some positives, particularly with limited improvements in the relationships between developing countries and international cooperation partners. It found little evidence, however, of improvements in democratic ownership, highlighting that ownership over the development process has yet to move much beyond the executive arm of government, with a few exceptions. Finally, the RoA concluded that there is a shrinking space for civil society, with issues around transparency remaining, and little or no progress on corruption through independent investigation, legal redress and action (a finding shared both by the Survey and the Evaluation).

So, given the results of these evaluations, what are participants saying in Busan?

CSOs and a limited number of donor governments, including the Danes, the Finns and, believe it or not, the new Italian government are saying that development is not only about economic growth, but “first and foremost it is about fulfilling the rights and needs of people.” More specifically, civil society is insisting that HLF4 results in development policies and practices that are rights-based, that guarantee space for civil society organisations and other non-state actors “in keeping with binding commitments outlined in international and regional instruments that guarantee fundamental rights, and ensure private sector involvement actually contributes to development, while respecting international labour standards and conventions.” The rights of women and girls continue to be neglected. At the same time tied aid (though there have been improvements, 21% remains tied), accountability, and conditionality remain serious challenges.

So, while the results have on the whole been disappointing and there is recognition that global conditions and the development context have changed for the worse, there is nonetheless a general acknowledgement that the development community should not be distracted from the Paris and Accra agenda. Instead we should begin to frame development challenges in the light of a new global context and the need to reach the poorest and most marginalized on the basis of international human rights frameworks.

This blog post was written by Joe Ingram and Shannon Kindornay, The North-South Institute. Both are delegates to the High Level Forum.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

Taking our seat at the table – how civil society “got its act together” to influence the Busan outcome

Yesterday evening I said good-bye to my fellow “Team Canada” colleagues as we walked back from a meeting with some members of the CIDA delegation, here for the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) (HLF4) in Busan. The Busan Global Civil Society Forum (BCSF) is over and today the HLF-4 begins with the full participation of 300 civil society delegates, along-side donors and partner governments.

The BCSF brought together more than 500 participants from civil society, from all corners of the world, for three days of intense discussions in preparation for the HLF4. Updates were given about where the negotiation process stood, decisions were made about the bottom lines for civil society as the civil society (CSO) Sherpa, Tony Tujan, walked into what we thought was the last negotiation session before the HLF, and the CSO team strategized along thematic and regional lines as to how best to push the CSO key asks during the upcoming 3 days.

This morning, the news was not good. Sherpas had a long night and did not managed to come to an agreement that met the minimal bottom-lines of all parties. So the tussle continues. Very significantly, China seems to have withdrawn from the process, and other countries, including France, were conspicuously absent on the last critical Sherpa meeting before the HLF-4 kicked off. And these are just the highlights, much more going on below the surface and behind closed doors.

Easy to feel concerned about the outcome of the next three days of meetings - like any global negotiation, the issues at play here are complex and multi-dimensional, and the number and diversity of actors with high stakes and divergent interests daunting.

But let’s take a look at the highlights of the process so far, from a civil society perspective, to take strength in what we have to build on.

There is no doubt that we have come a long way since Accra, and have lived up to the challenges posed to us since then in unequivocal and creative ways. Who could have assured us, in the lead-up to Busan, when civil society groups rallied to get a formal recognition in the outcome document (the Accra Agenda for Action – AAA) that at the next high level forum we would be included as development actors in our own right and that we would have a seat at the table – at the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, the Working Party Executive Committee, the many multi-stakeholder clusters and task teams, with our own Sherpa and with 300 official delegates at the forum itself.

This is without question an unprecedented experience for civil society – one from which we will no doubt draw many valuable lessons as we move forward into new challenges, in this process and other fields.  As I have come to understand the enormity of the achievements over the last three years in this regard, I have been struck by how in many ways this experience is counter-current to the shrinking of space for civil society that we are observing around the globe.

So, how did civil society get this seat at the table and how did we use it?

First, Better Aid. This broad global platform of CSOs, lead by southern organizations, has been the face of civil society in the process and has been the process via which we have produced common asks and negotiation positions - through a governance structure that has attempted to be as inclusive and democratic as possible, while being functional and efficient. Not an easy task, when you have hundreds of organizations from all over the world (more than 1700), that speak different languages, have different readings of the world and priorities, and different abilities and interests in the matter at hand. Brian Tomlison, Executive Director of AidWatch Canada and until recently Senior Policy Advisor with CCIC, says that “there is a respect that unites us all and does not undermine but rather strengthens all of our agendas”.

Brian Tomlinson (AidWatch Canada) in Busan

Second, The Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness. A process designed to respond to the challenge of establishing our own standards for effective development of CSOs, the Open Forum brought together more than 3,500 organizations from all regions of the world through consultations in over 70 countries. The outcomes: The Istanbul Principles and the International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness.  

Third, through the combined efforts of Better Aid and The Open Forum, CSOs arrived in Busan last week with a clear set of key asks for Busan. “It has been at times difficult, but we managed to unify and come to Busan with a collective voice”, says Emele Duituturaga, Executive Director of PIANGO and co-chair of the Open Forum. “Through this process, we have learned to dialogue and go forward as one.”

Brian Tomlinson adds, “though it is not bullet proof, a highlight of this whole process has been the unity of civil society in the face of a very complex agenda with diverse special interests. We have come to HLF4 with a common set of bottom lines which are strongly rooted in a human rights approach to development”.

It is without any doubt, the combination of having produced our own standards for development effectiveness and our common key asks that have allowed for  CSOs to be instrumental, in the lead-up process to HLF4, to not losing sight of the most important issue – better development outcomes for the poor and marginalized around the world. Through its participation in the numerous multi-stakeholder platforms that worked to prepare the ground for Busan, CSOs were able to make important contributions to increase the ambition in the Busan Outcome Document (BOD), and this has been broadly recognized. “We have transformed the process,” says Emele, “and this is how we will transform the world”.

But as I leave, I also reflect on the many challenges that lie ahead for global civil society. It was not an easy or quick process to come up with a statement at the end of the BCSF. But after a couple of hours of group discussions and then plenary discussions, and finally a committee review, we had a statement that synthesized the top concerns of the participants of the forum. So we still have work to do on how to best work together in a fair and representative structure that delivers results.



Emele Duituturaga (PIANGO) in Busan



After Busan, CSOs will re-convene to start a much needed reflection on this exceptional experience, and evaluate the pros and cons of this new role of being at the table while remaining activists in spirit and intent.

“Civil society came at this driven by moral and ethical motivations, but being at the table means we have had to negotiate” says Brian, who was also co-chair of the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment.

“We know we have to devise a process to move the agenda forward at the country level”.

And Emele rightfully reminds us, “after having being at the table and negotiated as equals, many of us now have to go back to our countries and face the hostile relationship with our governments”.



This blog post was written by Julia Sanchez, Canadian Council for International Co-operation.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

Aid and the Private Sector – How to make sure people and development profits

“Busan is to do for the private sector what Accra did for civil society,” stated a donor, speaking at an event on the private sector in Europe.

It is perhaps no surprise that a key focus by members of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness has been to try to bring the private sector “into the tent” through the front door of the Busan Outcome Document.

Busan comes just over a year after G20 leaders put their stamp on the Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth – essentially an updated version of the "Washington Consensus" with a sprinkle of equity thrown in – and a year after Seoul convened the B20, a forum of over 100 business leaders from G20 countries.

The G20 stamp is all over Busan, with a new vision for development that it is not merely “supported” but rather “driven by strong, sustainable and inclusive growth” (my emphasis - Busan Outcome Document, para 26a). Within this, it sees the private sector as the engine of that growth, “advancing innovation, creating wealth, income and jobs, mobilizing domestic resources, and in turn contributing to poverty reduction” (para 30). It leaves you wondering what states will be left to do.

For civil society, some of these issues – like the new vision for development – are deal-breakers in the current negotiations. And so it is not surprising that the role of the private sector in development has been a source of contentious and heated discussion in many of the sessions over the past few days and will continue to be so in the days to come. The Reality of Aid Network is focusing its 2012 report on “Aid and the Private Sector” and held a workshop on the issue at the Busan Civil Society Forum. The High Level Forum (HLF4) will itself host a Private Sector Forum, a side event and Thematic Session on Public Private Co-operation (TS, designed to build on the Paris Declaration (PD) and Accra Agenda for Action (AAA)), and a Building Block on the Private Sector (BBs, to build an agenda for beyond Busan).

Some of the contention around the issue could emanate from the fact that non-governmental organizations, despite strong efforts to be involved in the discussions, have been shut out from the process. In all the other BBs and TSs it has a presence. But then so have Business Associations and Trade Unions.

So why now?

In the context of declining aid budgets, more emphasis is being placed on the “value for money” of existing aid resources, and how to catalyze Official Development Assistance (ODA) to generate additional development finance resources. Increasingly the focus is falling on innovative financing mechanisms, with aid as the “capital base” to leverage additional resources from the private sector or engage them in identifying solutions to development challenges.

To complement these investments donors are organizing new facilities and departments to blend ODA with funds raised on private capital markets.

Donors are also looking to new partnerships between the private sector, governments and civil society to deliver goods and services.

And so what are the key debates and reservations among civil society on this issue? There are five.

Firstly, whose private sector benefits? Civil society is not wholly opposed to aid being used to support the private sector. Most organizations recognize the potentially positive contributions the private sector can play in development. But for most CSOs (and the occasional donor!), the prerogative of aid is to support poverty reduction and supporting the realization of the rights of the most marginalized. This means that CSOs prioritize businesses indigenous to the country, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), and social enterprises, like cooperatives as recipients of aid.

Secondly, for years the emphasis in development has been on creating an enabling environment for business. The World Bank’s (much criticized) flagship Doing Business Report ranks countries according to the ease of doing business. In practice, while it may encourage countries to streamline heavy bureaucratic processes that choke innovation, this has also led to excessive deregulation, flexibilization of work forces, and attacks on labour rights. For civil society, however, the focus is wrong. It is less a question of creating an enabling environment to develop the private sector (and stimulate investment), than creating an environment that enables the private sector (and investment) to contribute to development. This is a subtle difference, but important.

Thirdly, aid must demonstrate both financial and development additionality. CSOs are concerned that scarce ODA could be diverted from where there is a deficit - domestic public and private sector in partner countries – to where there is essentially a surplus - international corporations. This means that aid for the private sector must clearly demonstrate the following: 1) Financial additionality: Scarce public moneys must target the appropriate sectors and businesses that would otherwise not have the funds available; and 2) Development additionality: Investments of aid resources in the private sector must clearly work towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals and eradicating poverty.

Fourthly, aid to the private sector must ensure positive development outcomes. To date, most indicators for measuring the development impacts of the private sector are fairly facile. It is an issue that bilateral and multilateral donors are struggling with. Too often the number of jobs created is the proxy. What civil society is demanding is a system that both measures short term results, but that also values longer term impacts and outcomes – like decent work, job security, or equal work for equal pay. Jobs provide an income. Decent work provides a livelihood.

Finally, civil society is also demanding that the private sector must follow a set of principles that guide their practice as development actors. And by this, we don’t mean corporate social responsibility (CSR). CSR can, if it is at the heart of an organization’s core business model, generate sustainable business practices; but more often than not it is just window dressing. The challenge for the private sector, as Penny Davies, the Policy Advisor at Diakonia Sweden noted in her presentation at the Reality of Aid workshop, is that when they engage in aid, they must abide by aid effectiveness principles beyond their own voluntary set of standards. Civil society has the Istanbul Principles. Why shouldn’t business have an equivalent?

Will Busan do for Business what Accra did for civil society? Yes. But unfortunately it will be “Business as usual”.

This blog post was written by Fraser Reilly-King, Canadian Council for International Co-operation, and Jeroen Kwakkenbos, European Network on Debt and Development. Both are members of the International Coordinating Committee of the Reality of Aid Network. 


The views expressed in this blog are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

“Enabling environment” – the tie that binds us

If there is one issue that seems to bind civil society organizations together – that could make or break the outcome of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) – it is the issue of “enabling environment.” 


The issue essentially came out of the last high level meeting, HLF3, in Accra, Ghana, in which CSOs were recognized as “independent development actors in their own right”, fulfilling a range of roles that are complementary to, but distinct from, those of government. And in order for civil society to reach their full potential, governments agreed to “work with CSOs to provide an enabling environment that maximizes their contributions to development.” 


So what is an “enabling environment”? Technically speaking it is the political and policy context created by governments, official donors and other development actors that affect the ways CSOs may carry out their work. In layman’s terms, it is essentially the amount of political space and freedom that CSOs have to do what they want to do. In this sense, an “enabling environment” is an essential pre-condition for CSOs to be able to realize their full potential in society. 


Since Accra, however, this space has eroded the world over. Civicus, the Act Alliance, and in Canada organizations like Voices, have all documented declining space for civil society. In almost all countries, CSOs, their staff and volunteers are experiencing political, financial and institutional vulnerability, arising from the changing policies and restrictive practices of their governments. 


Civil society is not alone in their perceptions of this threat. 


Speaking as the keynote on the first day of the Busan Global Civil Society Forum, Maina Kiai, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, also observed that the commitments made by governments to these rights have repeatedly been broken across the world. In addition to intimidation, governments have enacted regulatory frameworks that have inhibited CSOs’ ability to participate in the development planning as well as the disbursement of aid. 


Yet for Mr. Kiai, development without rights is untenable. The Arab Spring, he said, demonstrated that growth and development can only go so far if they are not accompanied by the realization of political freedoms and rights. And CSOs have a critical role to play in this, ”building an active, engaged citizenry, which in turn helps build democracy”. 


Even the Korean example, he said, demonstrated that it is impossible for a country to continue to grow without political rights. 


“Progress towards the realization of economic, social and cultural rights needs high levels of accountability and transparency, underpinned by civil and political rights.” 


So what is the significance of all of this for Busan? 


Mr. Kiai pointed to the work of the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment (TT), a sub-group of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness that was established in 2009 to promote the implementation of civil-society related commitments in Accra. 


Co-chaired by Mali, Sweden and the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (on behalf of the Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness), a key component of the task team’s work has been to gather evidence on the environments in which CSOs operate and to provide clarity on the characteristics of enabling environments. 


So what then is required of governments? What are the minimum standards and fundamental rights that governments must guarantee to ensure an enabling environment for CSOs? 


The Task Team is clear on this: freedom of association, freedom of expression, the right to operate free from unwarranted state interference, the right to communicate and cooperation, the right to seek and secure funding, and the state’s duty to protect. 


Mr. Kiai welcomed these recommendations in his keynote address, emphasizing that these fundamental rights have already been agreed upon by governments and that, without an enabling space, CSOs cannot work as independent development actors in their own right. 


So what does all of this mean for civil society, for HLF4 and for the current Busan Outcome Document? 


It means everything, but it could leave us with nothing. 


While Article 21 reaffirms much of what was achieved in Accra – CSOs as development actors, the complementary role they play to government in shaping development policies and plans, and the need for an enabling environment – it goes no further. There is still no clear language around enabling environment and the minimum set of standards for interpreting what this entails. The language suggested by the task team is completely absent. 


As we noted at the beginning, an “enabling environment” is the essential pre-condition for Civil society to be able to realize their full potential. Recognizing the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework on CSO Development Effectiveness in the Outcome Document are important developments. But with no minimum guarantees that give civil society the space to implement the Principles, the recognition is meaningless. 


On November 28th, during the final negotiation of the Outcome Document, BetterAid will continue to try to push these standards into the text. Europe, the UK and Canada have all indicated their support for greater clarity in terms of what constitutes an enabling environment, but it is unclear the extent to which they are supportive of a minimum set of standards. 


Who knows what will happen? But what is certain is that “enabling environment” is the glue that holds civil society together. It allows us to realize our full potential in society. And without that glue, and without some clear standards on what that means, civil society will still hold together, but it could be our support for the outcome document that falls apart. 


This blog post was written by Brian Tomlinson, AidWatch Canada and Co-Chair of the Task Team on CSO Development Effectiveness and Enabling Environment, Shannon Kindornay, The North-South Institute, Fraser Reilly-King, Canadian Council for International Co-operation. 


The views expressed in this blog are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.