Le défi mondial d’éliminer la pauvreté et l’injustice : seule l’action collective peut transformer nos vœux en réalité (première partie)*

En 2008, le Conseil canadien pour la coopération internationale et ses membres adoptaient un programme en 10 points visant à s’attaquer aux causes profondes de la pauvreté et de l’injustice dans le monde. Ce programme présentait une vision de la société civile canadienne quant à la façon dont le Canada peut jouer un rôle décisif pour aider à mettre un terme à la pauvreté et à l’injustice.

Trois ans plus tard ce plan d’action demeure, plus que jamais, d’actualité. A la fin d’une année mouvementée pour les organisations internationales et nationales impliquées dans le développement  international, je vous en présente les grandes lignes, comme un appel renouvelé à serrer les rangs et à redoubler d’ardeur pour que les priorités de ce plan deviennent réalité.

1)      Promouvoir  les droits des femmes et l’égalité des sexes

Toutes les statistiques le confirment : à l’échelle planétaire, les femmes sont beaucoup plus touchées par la pauvreté, l’exclusion et l’analphabétisme. Les femmes n’ont pas les mêmes possibilités que les hommes de façonner le développement social, politique et économique et d’y participer.

Le Canada a réduit radicalement le financement versé au mouvement des femmes ainsi qu’à la recherche et au plaidoyer. La situation est semblable dans le reste du monde. Nous devons renverser la tendance si nous tenons vraiment à instaurer l’égalité entre les sexes. Les mesures du Canada doivent comprendre un soutien considérable aux organisations de défense des droits de femmes, ainsi qu’une attention explicite aux inégalités entre les sexes dans l’ensemble des initiatives internationales en matière de diplomatie, d’aide, de commerce et de défense.

2)      Promouvoir  la santé et l’éducation pour tous

Toutes les personnes ont le droit à l’éducation et à la meilleure santé physique et mentale possible. La santé et l’instruction sont des préalables nécessaires à l’élimination de la pauvreté et à l’exercice de tous les autres droits.

Les experts reconnaissent que la santé, la pauvreté et l’éducation sont inextricablement liés. La dégradation de l’environnement et la pollution ont également un impact négatif sur la santé.

La population canadienne a accès à des services de santé et d’éducation universels, financés par l’État, et les apprécie (bien que des remises en question inquiétantes aient cours récemment) . Nos politiques d’aide internationale doivent appuyer l’accès à de tels services de qualité dans les pays en développement. Le Canada doit aussi agir comme chef de file pour exclure des accords commerciaux les services sociaux tels que la santé, l’éducation et l’eau potable.

3)      Promouvoir le droit à l’alimentation et assurer des moyens de subsistance viables aux producteurs d’aliments dans les pays en développement

Une alimentation convenable pour tous constitue un droit des plus fondamentaux. Or, les aliments sont devenus une simple marchandise régie par les lois du marché. La moitié des personnes les plus affamées au monde sont en fait des producteurs agricoles, surtout des femmes.

La géographie de la faim est le reflet de l’iniquité des règles commerciales et d’une industrialisation mondiale de l’agriculture qui prive les petits exploitants agricoles de leurs droits.

Le Canada devrait plaider en faveur de règles commerciales plus équitables qui mettent un terme aux subventions injustes, préservent les marchés locaux, et ouvrent les marchés du Nord aux producteurs du Sud. Notre aide devrait privilégier des initiatives fondées sur les connaissances et les méthodes écologiques des agriculteurs locaux, plutôt que des solutions techniques venues d’ailleurs.

4)      Bâtir un monde de justice économique

Chaque année, des centaines de milliards de dollars affluent des pays pauvres vers les pays riches sous forme de remboursement de la dette et de bénéfices pour le secteur privé ainsi que par l’entremise du commerce inéquitable et de la fuite de capitaux. Ces sommes sont de loin supérieures à celles de l’aide internationale octroyée aux pauvres.

Au nord comme au sud, de plus en plus d’acteurs de la société civile s’opposent à une mondialisation économique qui favorise les riches (comme nous l’avons vu cette année notamment avec le mouvement des indignés). Ils plaident en faveur d’une approche de l’économie mondiale fondée sur la justice, qui accorde la priorité aux droits de la personne, et à la réforme des institutions financières internationales.

Il faut revoir en profondeur le système financier international et mettre en œuvre de nouveaux moyens pour financer le développement : taxation et redistribution de la richesse, optimisation des bénéfices publics tirés de l’investissement étranger, lutte contre la corruption, etc.

5)      Assurer la responsabilisation des entreprises

La première obligation de l’État, soit de faire respecter les droits fondamentaux de ses citoyens, cède maintenant souvent le pas à ses intérêts de défendre les droits des entreprises.

Les populations sont de plus en plus conscientes du fait que les sociétés du Nord ne respectent pas les mêmes normes à l’étranger que dans leur propre pays : les exemples de compagnies canadiennes implantées dans des pays en développement et aux pratiques environnementales et sociales douteuses se sont multipliées ces dernières années. L’adhésion des entreprises à des codes de bonne conduite volontaires n’a pas donné de résultats probants.

La société civile réclame que la responsabilité des entreprises soit obligatoire et réglementée, tant à l’échelle nationale qu’internationale, conformément aux normes internationales en matière de droits de la personne et de l’environnement.

(* ce texte s’inspire largement du document « Le défi mondial d’éliminer la pauvreté et l’injustice : un programme canadien en 10 points ». La 2^e partie du texte sera publiée la première semaine de janvier 2012)

Chantal Havard est agente de communication et de relations avec le gouvernement au CCCI.

Towards a New and Improved Americas Strategy for Canada?

In July 2007, the Prime Minister launched Canada’s “Re-engagement in the Americas” strategy. At the time, no policy document on the Americas Strategy was made available, nor were there any substantive opportunities for civil society engagement and comment. CCIC’s Americas Policy Group (APG) was left to piece together this elusive “Americas Strategy” by reviewing speeches, statements, political appointments and visits in the region.

Four years later, in October 2011, DFAIT decided to “review and renew” the Americas Strategy and approached the APG for input. DFAIT recognized that the original Americas Strategy had been somewhat haphazard and designed without sufficient input from civil society organizations. We were assured that the process would be different this time and were invited to participate in a series of consultations on Canada’s engagement in the Americas.

We were not sure whether to be pleased or skeptical. Would our participation help give credibility to their consultation process and imply that that we endorsed the final product – even if it didn’t reflect our views? Was this a worthwhile use of our sector’s already over-stretched time?

Despite these doubts, it seemed contradictory to turn down the opportunity after having criticized the government for its failure to consult civil society the first time around. We therefore agreed to participate in the process and to wait before making any definitive statements on its merits or demerits.

The consultations held thus far have been encouraging at times and discouraging at others. We are receiving signals that the government’s priorities in the Americas differ from our own. In a consultation on October 31st, Allan Culham (DFAIT’s DG of Hemispheric Affairs and Permanent Representative to the OAS) rejoiced at the free trade agreement with Colombia, pointed to Canada and Colombia’s robust trade numbers, and failed to mention human rights at all until prompted. The APG would have preferred to see him adopt a more nuanced approach to the trade deal, one that acknowledged the potential for Colombian lives and livelihoods to be affected by the scramble for metals and land, and one that took seriously the annual Human Rights Impact Assessment that both governments have agreed to conduct.

The consultation was nonetheless encouraging to the extent that many civil society organizations spoke up and voiced concerns similar to our own. Representatives from numerous Canadian civil society organizations called on the government to pay more attention to marginalized groups, to consider the root causes of organized crime and to improve Canadian extractive companies’ human rights and environmental record in the Americas.

A December 6th dialogue with Diane Ablonczy (Minister of State of Foreign Affairs, Americas & Consular Affairs) signaled, once again, that the government’s priorities in the Americas differ from our own. The panelists (12 men and 1 woman) were mainly business-oriented, and there was more discussion of how to compete with China for investments in the Americas than talk of human rights or equitable development. An Export Development Canada panelist stated that they key to Canada’s success in the region was its ability to “import labour without moving it” – in other words, to make full use of the cheap labour available in Latin America. The APG would have liked to hear a more nuanced statement: one that was accompanied by a recognition that the pursuit of cheap labour at all costs can be a slippery slope, especially in contexts where the right to unionize is severely constricted.

DFAIT has also asked for written input on Canada’s engagement with the Americas, and the APG has agreed to submit its recommendations. We will continue to promote an Americas Strategy that is based on respect for the full spectrum of human rights for all citizens of the hemisphere - an Americas Strategy that leaves no one behind. The civil society voices we heard at the October 31st consultation with Allan Culham suggest that others want the same thing. We hope that our participation in this process will encourage the government to think about these issues and include them in its Strategy. If the government is serious about putting together a new, improved and inclusive strategy for the Americas, it should.


This blog post was written by Brittany Lambert, coordinator of CCIC's Americas Policy Group (APG).

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC, APG or its members.

Gauging the temperature of the new Global Partnership: Take Two

It was a relief to finally walk along the beach this morning, and feel the sand give way beneath my feet – something real after eight consecutive days of heady discussions and negotiations with government officials and among ourselves. 


Looking back on the city from a vantage point on the rocks, you could see storm clouds in the distance retreating behind Busan’s rolling hills and its metallic-coloured skyscrapers, tall fingers of glass trying to poke a hole in the sky. In the distance, out on the edge of the sea, soft misty clouds blur the horizon. 


A day earlier, Angel Gurria, the Secretary-General of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Brian Atwood, the Chair of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, and Talaat Abdel-Malek, the Chair of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), were all patting themselves on the back for a “job well done”. 


The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation is indeed in many ways a landmark accomplishment. It has extended the tent to a broader range of development actors – including emerging economies, the private sector, and civil society – and framed an agenda for aid and development effectiveness going forward. Furthermore, Mexico, Brazil and South Africa genuinely seem committed to the full partnership, having committed themselves to it before China rejoined the negotiations, but downgraded its own status within the framework and the principles of “South-South cooperation” to a purely “voluntary” arrangement. 


This is unfortunate as it means a slow boat for China to real aid and development effectiveness. But then it was always the prerogative of the OECD and many of the donors to get China in the tent, and at any price. They paid it, it would seem. 


On the flip side, if China even shows a little more commitment to Busan than the traditional donors have shown to Paris and Accra, they will already be ahead of the game. 


Busan also established an important set of principles for all development actors that are “consistent with our agreed international commitments on human rights, decent work, gender equality, environmental sustainability and disability,” and move beyond Paris in important ways. Ownership has a more democratic orientation, refocusing on countries instead of just states – and sets out a more inclusive role for all development actors, including parliaments, local governments and CSOs in shaping development policy. And while the Busan Partnership may still focus on “results”, again its orientation is longer term, looking at outcomes that have “a lasting impact on eradicating poverty and reducing inequality.” Transparency and accountability also goes beyond an inter donor-government relationship, to accountability to intended beneficiaries and respective citizens. 


In terms of specifics, the use of country systems is now the default option, the International Aid Transparency Initiative got a big boost of support, and gender equality and women’s empowerment made some important advances. Most importantly for civil society, the Istanbul Principles and the International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness, and the rights-based approaches of civil society to development, found international recognition – even from US Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, during the official opening. The enabling environment now has some link to “agreed international rights”, although how this new language will curb the current sway towards a disabling environment in many country contexts is unclear. Finally by extending the life of the WP-EFF until June, CSOs have an opportunity to shape the future aid architecture, and the all important indicators and monitoring framework for Busan. 


A number of other issues – like tied aid and aid predictability – stayed the course. 


 Where Busan fell short was on acknowledging the lack of implementation of Paris and Accra and the all essential follow-up to Busan, the vision for the private sector, fragile states and the gender action plan. As noted elsewhere on this blog, one of the key elements of the Paris Declaration was the inclusion of a set of indicators and a monitoring framework for tracking progress on implementation. This has illustrated how donors have largely failed to realize their commitments to Paris. And this has caused some scepticism about their ability to live up to Busan’s commitments, underscoring the importance of defining indicators and a monitoring framework for the Partnership, a decision deferred until June 2012. 


 Similarly, CSOs feel that donors need to focus on this “unfinished business” before they turn their attention to “big business”. A year after Seoul’s Development Consensus for Shared Growth, Busan not surprisingly places economic growth and the private sector at the heart of development, instead of the other way around. And while the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” has won broad support among more than 40 governments, fragile states are essentially getting a “raw deal”, with peace-building a wholly state-centric, rather than people-centred, process. Without a clear indicators and a monitoring framework, implementation will be a challenge. 


But beyond the specific text, civil society has its own accomplishments of which to be proud. 


At the opening of the Busan Global Civil Society Forum, Tony Tujan, the Chair of BetterAid and the CSO Sherpa at the negotiations, acknowledged that we of course want something from the Partnership that fulfils our demands. But beyond that, “whatever comes out of Busan, we want it to recognize our role as independent development actors that belong in an inclusive global partnership for development.” 


For the past three years, we have been fighting to have a seat at the table and keep that seat. We have not been given much space, but in that space, and throughout the fierce negotiations, our critical but constructive statements, and our thoughtful interventions, we have gone one step further. We will still have to fight for that seat, but now at least many more governments hopefully recognize why we deserve a seat at the table. 


“CSOs are a vibrant and essential feature in the democratic life of countries across the globe playing a vital role in advancing development effectiveness in order to achieve human rights, gender equality, social justice, decent work, environmental sustainability, peace and an end to corruption and impunity within a solid framework of democratic governance, rights-based approaches, and inclusive policy engagement,” said Emele Duituturaga, Co-Chair of the Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness, in her speech at the closing plenary. 


“We have truly valued our inclusion as equals at the HLF4 negotiating table and expect this practice to be replicated at national levels.” 


It is a goal worth shooting for. 


My thoughts come back to the beach in Busan, and somebody tells me it is snowing back in Ottawa. I hope the ground hasn’t frozen over yet. 


This blog post was written by Fraser Reilly-King, Canadian Council for International Co-operation.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.

A happy ending in Busan? Take One

In contrast to the rather mild weather that characterized the first two days of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4), the final day was met with a cold, rainy morning – gloomy to be sure, pathetic fallacy maybe. After all, the final day held the promise of a new Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation and participants descended on Bexco – the HLF4 venue – eager to see how the final act would play out in Busan.

And how did it all end? Was HLF4 a comedy? A tragedy? Well, perhaps that depends on your perspective. Participants spent the final day discussing the post-Busan agenda and topped it off with a closing ceremony where – with much fanfare and self-congratulation – delegates highlighted important gains and how they will take the outcome document forward.

And what are the important gains? Here’s my take:

Transparency: the Busan Outcome Document (BOD) makes transparency and accountability one of the shared principles for all development partners. Participants agreed to implement “a common, open standard for electronic publication of timely, comprehensive and forward-looking information on resources provided through development co-operation [...] with the aim of implementing it fully by December 2015.” In addition, countries like the United States and Canada, as well as donors such as the Inter-American Development Bank and International Fund for Agricultural Development have signed on to the International Aid Transparency Initiative, which aims to make information about aid spending easier to find, use and compare.

New Deal for Fragile States: a “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States” was struck in Busan committing parties that endorsed to “support inclusive country led and country owned transitions out of fragility based on a country-led fragility assessment developed by the g7+ [group of fragile and conflict affected states] with the support of international partners, a country-led one vision and one plan, a country compact to implement the plan, using the Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals (PSGs) to monitor progress, and support inclusive and participatory political dialogue.” This New Deal was welcomed in the BOD.

Enabling Environment for Civil Society: While civil society would have liked to see more gains in the BOD on, for example, broad commitment to the rights-based approach and more recognition on the lack of progress against Paris and Accra, CSOs successfully negotiated the inclusion of reference to international rights in relation to commitments on an enabling environment – a key ask for civil society. The final BOD reads that governments will “implement fully respective commitments to enable CSOs to exercise their roles as independent development actors, with a particular focus on an enabling environment, consistent with agreed international rights, that maximises the contributions of CSOs to development.”

Of course, there are also areas of mixed success.

Enlarging the tent: A goal for HLF4 was to develop a Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation. Organizers wanted to broaden the number of actors engaged in aid effectiveness discussions, bringing Southern providers of development assistance and private sector actors into the fold. Countries like China, India and Brazil have endorsed the shared principles in the BOD, effectively enlarging the tent from what was historically a traditional donor driven agenda. However, this victory is bittersweet as these countries have not signed on to any specific commitments. Nevertheless, this success has prompted the Chair of the OECD Development Assistance Committee, Brian Atwood to shout from the rooftops that the OECD is no longer a “rich men’s club.” He later suggested that future meetings of the Global Partnership – which is to be an inclusive, representative body that oversees the commitments made in Busan at the global level – could be held in conjunction with OECD DAC High Level Ministerial Meetings. The irony of this suggestion, following on the heels of his earlier statement, was not lost on this blogger.

Beyond Aid: The BOD broadened the aid effectiveness agenda to development cooperation. While it references the role of the private sector, south-south cooperation and triangular cooperation, combating corruption and illicit flows, and climate change finance, it does not spell out a broad agenda for better policy coherence for development. In other words, it does not challenge the systemic problems facing developing countries, such as, for example, unfair trade policies on agriculture subsidies and non-tariff barriers, or work to better facilitate the transfer of remittances from developed countries to the developing world – key challenges facing developing countries whose solution would greatly benefit development efforts. But then again, maybe movement on these issues is too much to expect from a High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. Nevertheless, the agenda has broadened, and this should be welcomed. Perhaps it represents the first step towards putting these systemic issues on the table.

So how will these gains be taken forward?

The outcome document essentially discusses the post-Busan agenda in two ways, first in terms of how commitments will be monitored and evaluated, and secondly, in terms of the institutional makeup that will oversee these processes. At this point, participants have essentially agreed to agree later on both fronts, and there seems to be little urgency in terms of taking these important commitments forward. Nevertheless the outcome document provides some general guidance in both areas.

Participants in Busan have extended a lifeline to the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF), which has historically overseen the high level process and monitoring of commitments, and whose mandate was supposed to be up in Busan. On the issue of indicators, by June 2012, the WP-EFF will decide on how commitments are monitored and evaluated at the global level. Monitoring and evaluation at the country level will be decided through nationally-led multi-stakeholder processes. Indeed, the mantra of the post-Busan agenda has become “global light, country heavy.” Participants have agreed to develop a selective and relevant set of indicators and targets to monitor progress at the global level – the bulk of their focus however, will be at the country level.

And who will oversee the monitoring and evaluation process?

The BOD commits participants to a “new, inclusive and representative Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation to support and ensure accountability for the implementation of commitments at the political level.” The sentiment in Busan is that the lack of progress on Paris and Accra is a result of little political support for the aid effectiveness agenda, as highlighted in CCIC’s blog on Day 1 of HLF4. In response, the BOD suggests that the Global Partnership will be characterized by regular ministerial-level engagement – this is a bid to develop and maintain political support for the BOD and its implementation. These meetings would be held in conjunction with other fora.

The outcome document also invites the UN Development Cooperation Forum – a multi-stakeholder forum within the UN that dialogues on issue relating to development cooperation – to play a role. It also refers to the OECD and the UNDP, which may play an important role in monitoring global and national commitments.

So, is Busan a comedy, tragedy or something else? Only time will tell, as the answer to this question is – like its predecessors in Paris and Accra – all in the implementation.

This blog post was written by Shannon Kindornay, The North-South Institute, and delegate to the Fourth High Level Forum.

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of CCIC or its members.