This was a wake-up call, not a walk-out, to the Global Partnership

If I push my face right up to the window of my hotel room, I can just about see the Eiffel Tower rise high above Paris’s cityscape. Just below me is the Seine. And behind me, out of view, lies the office complex of La Défense and its modern-day Arche de Triomphe.
The contrast between the two visions – traditional and modern – is striking.
For the past week, I have been here in Paris preparing for, and then participating in, the final meeting of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF).
Since 2003, the WP-EFF has led a series of High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness (HLF), initially among OECD donors and partner governments, and more recently a much broader range of development actors. The HLFs produced the seminal Paris Declaration (PD) in 2005, the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008, and more recently, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (BPd) in 2011.
While Busan did move the agenda forward, for the past six months civil society has been keenly observing and participating in the work of the Post-Busan Interim Group (PBIG). The PBIG was tasked with the design of the global monitoring framework and indicators for assessing progress on Busan, and the governance framework of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC).

This final meeting was to discuss and finalize the PBIG proposals and launch the new Global Partnership, the WP-EFF’s successor.

For me personally, this has just been a journey over the past year and a half, but for many of my colleagues here they have been following the trajectory of the WP-EFF and developments around aid effectiveness as far back as 2005.

Back then there were 17 people protesting out on the streets. Today there were 35 of us participating inside the room.
This past week, we managed to get a bit of a taste of how far we have come since Paris. On Wednesday, as it did for HLF-3 in Accra, BetterAid released a book documenting the accomplishments, experiences, assessment and outcomes of what we achieved between HLF-3 and HLF-4 in Busan.
Separate from that book, people here feel that In Accra, we were encouraged by the promises made by governments for an enabling environment, for human rights, decent work, sustainable environment and gender equality. And we welcomed our inclusion after Accra as independent development actors in our own right and as full members of the Working Party.

Through BetterAid, we advocated for a human rights framework for development, gender equality, decent work and environmental sustainability. Through the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness, we created the Istanbul Principles and the Siem Reap CSO International Framework.
At Busan we made some small progress – as well as suffered some big losses - both in terms of substance and process, engaging for the first time technically as an equal negotiator at the table.

And in Busan, while we recognized the incremental changes we had made, it felt like everything was still contingent on these coming six months.
In that vein, I guess the past two days have been a success.
The Working Party adopted the mandate and governance of the Global Partnership, with periodic Ministerial-level meetings, and a process driven by a Steering Committee of 18 - with a seat for civil society and co-Chaired by Andrew Mitchell, British Secretary of State for International Development. Two co-Chairs – from emerging economies and partner countries (likely Africa) – still have to be nominated by the end of July, as do ten of the other Steering Committee members.  (The North American seat will be taken by Donald Steinberg, US Administrator of USAID, with Canada opting to take the next rotation following the first Ministerial meeting of the Global Partnership in 2014.) The prospect of a possible observer seat for local government and trade unions has been kicked to the first Steering Committee meetings, likely to occur sometime this fall.

The monitoring framework and a set of 10 indicators - that will be used to assess progress on the commitments made in Busan - were also endorsed, using baselines of 2010 to measure progress. The indicators include a focus on inclusive country processes to determine results, enabling environment for CSOs, the contribution of the private sector to development, transparency, predictability, reporting of aid through budgets, mutual accountability, gender equality and women’s empowerment, effective institutions and the use of country systems, and untying aid. Wherever possible, the indicators are drawing on existing sources of data.  The Joint Support Team to the Steering Committee – UNDP and the OECD – still have to determine how to actually operationalize the agreed indicators.

Also endorsed at the meeting was a framework for a common open standard on transparency as agreed in Busan. This standard will ultimately join together the standard of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), which Canada signed on to at HLF4, and the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System. IATI is an aid data standard, whereby signatories provide detailed comparable information in an open data format. The CRS is also an open data database on donor aid spending produced by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) at the OECD. Whereas the CRS provides historical annual OECD donor data on aid flows, IATI allows users to dig down deeper into past, current and forward-looking spending at the project level (including narrative reports). The two standards will now be completely aligned and integrated, allowing for a single electronic reporting standard over the full range of aid spending for all donors, including CSOs as donors.

But while some of the outcomes seem positive, the past two days have left a sour taste in the mouth of many of the CSOs – and others – here.

Why? Perhaps not surprisingly, this first full gathering since Busan of WP-EFF members felt much less like the final negotiation of the Global Partnership, than a party for the Working Party. It began with somewhat mindless panels (about changing mindsets), high-level speakers giving warm and fuzzy speeches, and farewell parties. This is perhaps warranted to some extent given what the WP-EFF has achieved.

But as a result, it provided barely any opportunity to debate proposed changes to the proposals on monitoring and governance that had been drafted by the 18 members of the PBIG. Every amendment from CSOs, from NEPAD or CARICOM was responded to by the Chair with the resounding thud of a rubber stamp on the original proposal.

This hit a nerve for all of us in BetterAid – as well as partner countries, and some other stakeholders. So following the morning’s opening panel with OECD Secretary General Angel Gurria and Secretary of State Mitchell, the two BetterAid co-Chairs made a constructive statement to the Working Party addressing a sentiment that has been mounting and finally crystallized here in Paris. In short,

“The past six months have confirmed our belief that since Busan the multi-stakeholder nature of this forum has itself been compromised. It is not a global partnership, interested in generating consensus and compromise among the range of stakeholders – whether us or others. [...] At this point, we have elected to go back to our respective constituencies – more than 5,000 networks and organizations - to see whether we should continue to engage in this Global Partnership, and what the basis of that continued engagement should be. We remain committed to the spirit and principles of Busan.  For us, that means moving beyond paternalism and power imbalances to inclusive partnership and mutual respect.”

We are at the table, sure, but it is still a process led by three governmental co-Chairs, who can simply choose to replicate the experience of the past six months. And that is not a position we want to be in.

Various officials over the past few days have underscored time and time again the benefits and legitimacy that having civil society at the table has brought to this process.

It is great that these officials can see the benefits of having us there. We need to be able to see the benefits too. And for us, that means having a co-Chair and a seat for trade unions.
As I said at the beginning, from my window I can only see the old Paris out my window. But I can’t quite see the new.

This blog was written by Fraser Reilly-King, Policy Analyst (Aid), CCIC. The views expressed are his own, and do not necessarily represent the views of CCIC or its members.

CSOs on the Road from Accra to Busan (Part II)

To conclude, Brian pointed to ten lessons that can be drawn from this work that are preconditions of effective policy dialogue:

1)   All stakeholders must take their roles seriously and build upon previous accomplishments. For CSOs, this meant ensuring that we participated as independent development actors in our own right and that the dialogue moving forward was inclusive of all stakeholders setting the agenda and outcomes for Busan.

2)   There must be an openness to changing practice. For CSOs this meant changing the politics of this process - strengthening our own accountability to principles of CSO Development Effectiveness, and for all governments this meant being inclusive and respecting the views of all stakeholders. For civil society, it also meant balancing our focus on advocacy and messaging, with listening and negotiation skills. We also had to respect difference and the limitations of what could actually change, and work within a very complex dynamic.

3)   We were most successful when (and not always) there was clarity of purpose and mandate, and where we set realistic (but ambitious) objectives against realistic timelines. For civil society this is a challenge, since we often take a normative approach to issues, with a comprehensive agenda; but we soon realized that as participants in this process, to move the agenda forward,  we had to compromise.

4)   Multi-stakeholder processes need to be well-resourced. This is not just about financial resources – which donors provided through a pooled-funding mechanism that definitely helped facilitate national meetings and consultations and the preparations leading up to Busan – but also the human resources and leadership that all organizations participating committed.

5)   Civil society requires space and opportunity to construct iterative and representative processes from the ground up. It was important that we engaged as many CSOs as we did, but engaging civil society also requires space and time to draw out both the diverse views of CSOs and but also find the common threads.

6)   The need to reform processes for global, regional and national policy dialogue that are appropriate to and respect different multi-stakeholder requirements. In constructing multi-stakeholder processes, we need to actually reflect on whether these processes, are appropriate for all the stakeholders at the table. BetterAid was limited in the number of voices it could bring to the table, and we couldn’t always command the diverse constituencies and expertise we had.

7)   Multi-stakeholder processes work when all stakeholders recognize their responsibilities and seek to implement their commitments. Constructive policy dialogue builds on evidence drawn from implementation and from the challenges of implementing more ambitious reforms. For CSOs this means tackling the challenges we face as development actors, and being accountable at the national, regional and international level to the Istanbul Principles by examining and changing our practices.

8)   To sustain a focus on the country level requires deliberate efforts and significant investment of resources by all stakeholders. All said we need a country heavy framework for implementation of Busan. CSOs agreed that this was essential following Accra, and to some extent we did this. But as important as what we did was, these national engagements were episodic, but were unable to sustain a high-level of engagement at the country-level. This is limited by resources, by the spaces available, by support that is sustained irrespective of the changing agendas of governments, and by limited knowledge about these processes at the country level. Too often at the country level, we invest in the skills of very few people. This needs to change and we need to build much broader and deeper momentum at the country level

9)   There needs to be an enabling environment for CSOs that allow for multi-stakeholder dialogue. In Accra, enabling environment was not a major focus of our work; but since then, we have deepened our understanding of that issue, deepened the norms for what constitutes an enabling environment, and this has now emerged as a core issues in Busan.

10) Leadership is fundamental to generating the political will and sustaining behavioural and institutional change. This process had that in different degrees at the global, regional and national level, and we need to sustain that will. But to be successful, leadership must rise above and take risks.

Rich food for thought.

But what is now giving people indigestion are two things: whether the future Global Partnership will actually be able to sustain such a genuine multi-stakeholder as things slowly seem to be slipping back into an inter-governmental one; and whether ultimately this new global partnership is going to translate three years of work into better outcomes for the poor.

This blog was written by Fraser Reilly-King, Policy Analyst, CCIC. The views expressed are his own and not necessarily reflect the views of CCIC or its members.

CSOs on the Road from Accra to Busan (Part 1)

It is a rare thing that we find the time to stop, reflect and evaluate what we have achieved in our work – whether as civil society, as organizations or as individuals. There is always so much immediacy in our daily work lives that thinking feels like a pure luxury.

BetterAid has been ahead of the curve on this, documenting the experiences and evaluating the lessons learned of aid-focused organizations in the lead-up to the 3^rd High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-3) in 2008 in Accra, Ghana.

Reflecting on the value of that project, the day after the 4^th High-Level Forum (HLF-3) in Busan concluded, BetterAid decided to commission a similar report to cover the trajectory from Accra to Busan.

Today at a Multistakeholder Dialogue at the OECD in Paris, BetterAid, in cooperation with the Open Forum on CSO Development Effectiveness, launched a new book CSOs on the road from Accra to Busan reflecting on what had been accomplished and perceptions by other stakeholders of these accomplishments, documenting the experiences of CSOs in the process leading up to HLF-4, and identifying lessons learned.

The book drew on the policies and position papers developed by BetterAid and the Open Forum, the processes that the organizations pursued, work done at the country level to create the conditions to advance the civil society (CSO) aid and development agenda, and interviews with donors, some country governments, and civil society organizations.

Brian Tomlinson – formerly of CCIC and author of the book - touched upon the unique aspects of the process and our accomplishments as civil society, and identified many of the elements that contributed to a truly multi-stakeholder process.

In terms of the unique nature of the past three years, this represented an incredible building process from the country to the global level that brought 300 CSOs from around the world to Busan speaking with one voice.  This has not happened in other global processes.

Secondly, Busan represented a truly multi-stakeholder process, allowing for civil society to be represented and participate in robust processes leading up to Busan, and as an equal voice at the table.

Thirdly, CSOs undertook a global process to establish the conditions and approaches that defined their own understanding of development effectiveness through the Open Forum. This was related to Busan, but emerged from Accra as a process independent of Busan.

In terms of accomplishments, Brian identified five strands:

·         Through various processes after the past three years, BetterAid and Open Forum managed to mobilize thousands of CSOs in an inclusive and open way. This engagement made a qualitative difference in terms of how CSOs could present themselves.

·         CSOs fulfilled a commitment that was made pre-Accra to establish a normative framework for CSOs  - the Istanbul Principles and the Siem Reap Consensus – that created some authenticity to the notion of CSOs as independent development actors in their own right. Brian admitted that there was still more work to be done in terms of implementation, but in terms of standard setting, CSOs had accomplished a lot.

·         Because BetterAid and the Open Forum came together ahead of Busan with a common set of policy demands and speaking with one voice, this deepened our legitimacy and credibility as CSO actors. We were able to draw on the diversity of civil society as actors, but still come to the process in a united way – and this strengthened our presence and our voice.

·         Our engagement in the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness was informed and constructive, and this helped transform the discourse on a number of different issues – development effectiveness, democratic ownership, and human rights as a framework for development.

·         Finally, with Civil Society at the table, this created an important benchmark and a shift in culture towards inclusive policy dialogue and partnerships. This is something that could inform future and much broader dialogues at the OECD and inform other multilateral processes.

(The second part of this blog will be published soon...)

Fraser Reilly-King, Policy Analyst

CCIC

Vers un traité sur le commerce des armes : espoirs et défis

Du 2 au 27 juillet prochains, les 193 Etats membres des Nations unies se réuniront à New York pour un mois de discussions qui devrait aboutir au premier traité international sur le commerce des armes (TCA). Ce traité pourrait constituer la plus grande avancée du droit international pour la protection des populations civiles depuis la création de la Cour pénale internationale.  

La « règle d’or »

Ce traité devra déterminer dans quelles conditions les Etats peuvent autoriser un transfert d’armes (achat, vente, transit, etc.), notamment au regard des risques que représente ce transfert pour les droits humains et le développement. Et tout va se jouer sur une question de vocabulaire : « ne doivent pas » ou « devraient tenir compte ».

Oxfam-Québec, les ONG membres de la coalition internationale Control Arms, ainsi que de nombreux Etats favorables à un TCA fort et efficace militent pour que le texte du traité indique que  « les Etats ne doivent pas autoriser un transfert d’armes » lorsqu’il existe un risque substantiel que ces armes soient utilisées pour commettre des violations des droits humains ou que ce transfert ait un impact sur le développement du pays ou de la région.

Les opposants au traité cherchent à obtenir un langage moins contraignant : « les Etats devraient tenir compte de… » : ce qui laisse la possibilité aux Etats d’autoriser un transfert d’armes même si cela risque de contribuer à des violations des droits humains ou d'aggraver la pauvreté. Certains Etats (la Chine, Cuba ou l'Egypte pour ne pas les nommer) vont même jusqu'à remettre en question la notion de droits humains, prétextant qu'il s'agit d'un concept subjectif.

Le champ d’application du traité

Autre point de désaccord entre les différents Etats, ce que le traité doit couvrir : toutes les armes conventionnelles (c'est-à-dire hormis les armes chimiques et nucléaires), y compris les armes légères et de petit calibre ? Les munitions ? Les radars et matériels de communication ? Les composantes technologiques nécessaires à la construction d’armes ? Les équipements de police et de maintien de l’ordre dont le printemps Arabe a cruellement illustré le potentiel destructeur ? Là encore, les partisans d’un TCA faible et peu contraignant cherchent à limiter l’étendue du traité, alors que les ONG estiment que celui-ci devra couvrir l’éventail le plus large possible d’armes pour avoir un réel impact sur le terrain.

La transparence

Les négociations doivent aussi fixer les règles de mise en œuvre du traité par les Etats qui le ratifieront et notamment les mécanismes de contrôle : compte-rendu annuel des Etats sur leurs transferts d’armes, suivi des transferts pouvant constituer des violations du traité et du respect par les Etats du traité, règlement des différends et sanctions. Sans transparence et sans contrôle de son respect par les signataires, le TCA ne serait qu’une coquille vide.

Consensus ou majorité ?

Au-delà du contenu du TCA, le mode d’adoption même du traité suscite des oppositions : certains Etats, qui ne veulent pas d’un texte fort, comme les Etats-Unis, la Russie ou encore l’Egypte, réclament un « consensus » strict, c'est-à-dire adopté à l'unanimité. Dans ce cas, le texte doit convenir à tous les Etats. En pratique, cela revient à donner un droit de veto à chaque Etat, et mécaniquement à affaiblir le traité, en adoptant le plus petit dénominateur commun. Une adoption du traité par un vote des Etats permettrait d’obtenir un texte qui convient à une majorité d’Etats et laisse plus de chance à un TCA fort.

La place des ONG

Enfin, la place laissée à la société civile, par la voix des ONG, reste encore à déterminer : en théorie les sessions plénières et les principaux comités thématiques seront ouverts aux ONG (en tant qu’observateurs). Mais en pratique, combien de sessions seront réservées aux seuls délégués des Etats, permettant de négocier des compromis et arrangements en toute opacité, loin des yeux de la société civile et des citoyens à travers le monde qui se sont engagés en faveur d’un TCA robuste et efficace depuis de nombreuses années ? Ainsi, le dernier Comité préparatoire de la Conférence finale, en février dernier, a vu les sessions à huis clos se multiplier, réduisant la capacité de vigilance et d’influence de la société civile internationale.

Autant de questions qui détermineront si le texte adopté en juillet pourra avoir un impact réel sur les millions de personnes qui souffrent directement ou indirectement de ce commerce meurtrier.

Par Lina Holguin, Directrice des politiques, Oxfam-Québec

Ajoutez votre nom à la pétition Donnez de la voix pour contrôler les armes ! (« PAS D'ARMES POUR LES ATROCITÉS – DITES OUI À UN TRAITÉ SUR LE COMMERCE DES ARMES À TOUTE ÉPREUVE »). La pétition prie les gouvernements de conclure un TCA garant des droits de l'homme, capable de sauver des vies et des moyens de subsistance.